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“‘[N]o fund is more sacred than the school fund, and perhaps 
there is no other fund so sacred; it should be guarded in every 
manner possible.’”1 
                                                     
 
 1. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 647, 96 Idaho 793, 805 (1975) (quoting 
Delegate McConnell’s statement at the Idaho Constitutional Convention of 1889). 
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Providing education is among the most important state functions.2 
But no matter how important, or how universal the agreement that edu-
cation should be adequately funded, not everyone agrees on how much 
money is needed or where it should come from. In Idaho, this disagree-
ment eventually started a “twenty years’ war”3 of litigation, beginning 
in 1993 with Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans 
(ISEEO I).4 
An Idaho public school student may be oblivious to the legal forc-
es—like those on display in ISEEO I—shaping her education. She hears 
that Idaho ranks poorly in key metrics such as per-pupil spending, 
teacher salaries, and college attendance.5 Yet, despite her community’s 
recent effort to pass a tax levy,6 she may also hear the conflicting view 
that more money is not the answer.7 And even if she subscribes to the 
common view that her school needs more money,8 she is probably una-
ware that the defining moments for Idaho’s education spending have 
taken place in the courtroom and chambers of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
In exercising its power to “say what the law is,”9 the Court has had to 
                                                     
 2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954).  
 3. For another use of this moniker, see Bret Stephens, The Twenty Years’ War: 
Defeating Saddam Took 19 Years Too Long, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703846604575447203550463656. “It 
matters what we call our wars, lest we fail to understand them.” Id.  
 4. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans (ISEEO I), 850 P.2d 724, 123 
Idaho 573 (1993). ISEEO I raised issues that are still being litigated twenty years later. See 
infra Part II.D. It also raised important issues from Thompson, 537 P.2d 635, 96 Idaho 793, 
an earlier education finance case, which is discussed throughout this Note. 
 5. See, e.g., MARK DIXON, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES: 2011, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU 11 (2013), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/school/11f33pub.pdf (ranking 
Idaho fiftieth in per-pupil spending); Nate Green, Shame: Idaho Ranks Poorly in Many Key 
Areas, IDAHO PRESS-TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 2012, http://www.idahopress.com/news/state/room-
for-improvement-in-idaho/article_69e564a4-3f3f-11e1-a84c-0019bb2963f4.html (reporting 
rankings by the National Center for Education Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau, which 
place Idaho forty-second for teacher salary and forty-seventh for college enrollment after 
high school). 
 6. The number of Idaho districts with tax levies has increased dramatically over 
the last decade. See MICHAEL FERGUSON, IDAHO PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDING – 1986 TO 2013, at 
14 fig. 11 (2012), available at http://idahocfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Idaho-Public-
School-Funding-1980-to-2013.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., Green, supra note 5 (reporting State Superintendent Tom Luna’s sen-
timent that more money is not the “silver bullet” fix for Idaho’s poor rankings in college en-
rollment and graduation); see also Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State (ISEEO 
III), 976 P.2d 913, 921, 132 Idaho 559, 567 (1998) (discussing Idaho’s counter-complaint 
against district superintendents alleging that any deficiency in funding was brought about 
by those superintendents’ mismanagement).   
 8. William J. Bushaw & Shane J. Lopez, Which Way Do We Go?, KAPPAN, Sept. 
2013, at 9, 20, available at http://pdkintl.org/noindex/2013_PDKGallup.pdf (reporting recent 
poll results where Americans cited lack of funding as the number one problem facing their 
local schools); see also Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, No. 94008, at 8 (4th 
Jud. Dist. of Idaho Feb. 5, 2001), available at 
http://fourthjudicialcourt.idaho.gov/pdf/id_schools_decision.pdf (“There is no question that all 
Idaho schools could benefit from substantially increased funding.”). 
 9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
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say what the Idaho Constitution’s education clause means. Not everyone 
is content with the result, particularly regarding education finance. 
This Note examines Idaho’s education finance from a legal perspec-
tive and argues that the state’s constitution—together with the judici-
ary’s interpretation of it since Thompson v. Engelking10—stymies Ida-
ho’s ability to sufficiently fund public education. This Note also poses a 
solution: a constitutional amendment that requires more from Idaho’s 
government. Part I provides background by placing Idaho’s education 
finance litigation in historical context, and outlines the relationship be-
tween education clause language and education funding. Part II dis-
cusses Idaho’s education finance system and suggests that whatever its 
shortcomings, options for challenging it are exhausted. Part III identi-
fies constitutional amendment as the remaining option to improve Ida-
ho’s education funding, and Part IV introduces and conducts a compara-
tive analysis to identify specific language that could be included in such 
an amendment. Part V offers draft language for the amendment, and 
recommends two implementation stages. Part VI concludes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Education finance has been litigated in all but five states.11 Typi-
cally, the focus is on equitable funding between districts within a state, 
adequate funding in the state as a whole, or both.12 Besides these cate-
gories, scholars have also identified three temporal waves of litigation.13 
In the 1960s, plaintiffs invoked equal protection arguments under the 
14th Amendment.14 This wave ended in 1973 with San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez,15 where the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that education is not a fundamental right and consequently did not 
require the application of strict scrutiny.16 This foreclosed equal protec-
tion claims under the U.S. Constitution; despite disparities in funding 
between districts, local property taxes were viewed as a rational means 
                                                     
 10. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 647, 96 Idaho 793, 805 (1975). 
 11. Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah. EDUC. JUSTICE, 
http://www.educationjustice.org/index.html (use map index to navigate to individual state 
summaries) (last visited June 29, 2014). 
 12. See Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of 
State Constitutions, B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 1, 9 (1997); Phil Weiser, What’s Quality Got to Do 
with It?: Constitutional Theory, Politics, and Education Reform, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 745, 753 (1995). When this Note refers to “equity” or “adequacy,” it is in reference to 
the types of funding challenges identified here. 
 13. See, e.g., Kevin Randall Mcmillan, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth 
Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts’ Lingering Institutional Concerns, 
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867, 1869 (1998). 
 14. Id. 
 15. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 16. Mcmillan, supra note 13, at 1870. 
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of achieving legitimate local and state control of education finance.17 
This shifted the ensuing second wave to equal protection claims under 
state constitutions.18 A third wave of claims began in 1989, which raise 
adequacy concerns under states’ education clauses.19 
Idaho’s education finance litigation caught the second and third 
waves, starting in 1975 with three equity arguments raised in Thomp-
son.20 Then, in 1993, Idaho saw the onset of third-wave adequacy litiga-
tion: specifically, the plaintiff in ISEEO I complained that the “system of 
funding public schools [was] unconstitutional because it [did] not pro-
vide a thorough education in that necessary resources [were] unavaila-
ble due to lack of money.”21 The plaintiff also raised an equity argument 
from Thompson, alleging that spending disparities between districts 
violated the education clause’s uniformity requirement.22 The Idaho Su-
preme Court affirmed Thompson, but when it later held the state’s fi-
nancing scheme unconstitutional in Idaho Schools for Equal Education 
Opportunity v. State (ISEEO V),23 equity was a key factor underlying 
the holding.24 
Even though the ISSEO V plaintiffs won, the issues are far from 
resolved. Some individuals continue to despair Idaho’s education finance 
system,25 and shortly after ISSEO V, the plaintiffs took the issue to the 
federal level, claiming the Legislature failed to provide a remedy.26 
                                                     
 17. Id. at 1871. 
 18. Id. New Jersey’s Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) began the second 
wave. Id. at 1872. 
 19. Id. at 1875. Kentucky’s Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 
(Ky. 1989), is credited as the first third-wave case. Id. at 1876. That same year, Montana and 
Texas also used their education clauses to strike down their education finance systems. Wil-
liam E. Thro, The Role of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 78 ED. L. 
REP. 19, 21 (1993).  
 20. After discussing the United States Supreme Court’s holding and reasoning in 
Rodriguez, the Idaho Supreme Court quickly dispensed with the equal protection arguments 
resting on both the federal and Idaho constitutions. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d at 642, 
96 Idaho at 800. In responding to the third equity argument, which rested on Idaho’s educa-
tion clause, the Court examined the clause’s requirement for a “general and uniform” system 
of education, and held that it required neither equal “services and facilities” throughout the 
state, nor equal per-pupil expenditures. Id. at 647, 650, 96 Idaho at 805, 808. 
 21. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 729, 123 Idaho 573, 578 (1993). 
 22. Id. at 729–30, 123 Idaho 573 at 578–79. 
 23. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State (ISEEO V), 129 P.3d 1199, 142 
Idaho 450 (2005). 
 24. Id. at 1205–06, 142 Idaho at 456–57. The Idaho Supreme Court’s holding was 
largely based on concerns for Idaho’s poorest districts and their access to safe facilities. See 
infra Part II.A. One scholar labels these types of suits “hybrid claims” that “combine[] the 
equal protection/equality claim with the education clause/adequacy claim,” and tend to be 
“very successful.” Jensen, supra note 12, at 27. 
 25. E.g., FERGUSON, supra note 6.  
 26. See Kress v. Copple-Trout, CV-07-261-S-BLW, 2008 WL 352620 (D. Idaho Feb. 
7, 2008) (discussing plaintiffs’ complaint that the Idaho Supreme Court’s failure to order the 
Legislature to take specific action in ISEEO V violated plaintiffs’ due process rights), on re-
consideration, CV-07-261-S-BLW, 2008 WL 2095602 (D. Idaho May 16, 2008). This argument 
was raised again in a 2012 lawsuit. See Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory 
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Some have also accused the Legislature of making matters worse in the 
years since ISSEO V by forcing districts to rely more heavily on levies 
that exacerbate existing resource disparities.27 This state of affairs un-
derscores the importance of understanding Idaho’s education finance 
litigation, determining why it has failed to bring about change, and find-
ing a solution. 
A. The Relationship Between a State’s Constitution and Education 
Funding 
Providing education in the United States has always been a local 
endeavor.28 Scholars credit the Ye Old Deluder Satan Act, a 1647 piece 
of Massachusetts legislation, with establishing this American tradition 
of local governance, under which education is both locally controlled and 
funded.29 This model spread to the nation’s territories and eventually 
dominated as states entered the Union.30 This section briefly discusses 
the dynamic between the local and state political units that affect edu-
cation funding and then discusses the specific dynamics operating in 
Idaho. 
i. The General Political Dynamics of Education Finance 
Although it was once the case that local districts had the greatest 
responsibility for education, there are strong indicators that local con-
trol is decreasing.31 Among them are the school district consolidation 
movement of the twentieth century, states’ greater assumption of re-
sponsibility for financing education, and states’ ever-increasing de-
mands for content standards, changes to curricula, and uniform systems 
of examination.32 
Against this backdrop, education funding has persisted as a joint 
venture between states and local school districts. All fifty states consti-
tutionally mandate the creation of a public school system,33 but all 
                                                                                                                           
Judgment, Refund of Fees Paid, and other Relief, at para. 38, Joki v. Idaho, No. CIV00-212-
S-LMB (Oct. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Amended Class Action Complaint] (on file with author). 
 27. E.g., Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 26, at para. 38; FERGUSON, 
supra note 6, at 9, 13.  
 28. Joseph P. Viteretti, The Federal Role in School Reform: Obama’s Race to the 
Top, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2087, 2088 (2012). This in spite of high-profile federal educa-
tion policies like George W. Bush’s No Child Left Behind and Barack Obama’s more recent 
Race to the Top initiative. See generally id. at 2087. 
 29. See James W. Guthrie, American Education Reform: What Is Needed Is ‘Na-
tional’ Not Federal, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 125, 133 (1997).  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 133–34. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Jensen, supra note 12, at 1, 3.  
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states share the financing responsibility with local governments.34 Thus, 
a defining feature of education funding in the United States is its heavy 
reliance on local property taxes.35 Across the nation, this has generated 
much litigation, primarily because differences in property value between 
districts give rise to inequalities in funding capacity.36 
States protect and define the rights surrounding education, which 
they accomplish by administering their education clauses.37 There is an 
inherent tension in these clauses: they create the need for funding edu-
cation yet rarely deal with the funding question directly and instead 
leave the mechanics to the state legislatures.38 In short, a state’s educa-
tion clause, while certain to demand an education system, is unlikely to 
specify how to fund it. 
This tension is a major theme in education finance litigation, and 
some education clauses generate better results for plaintiffs.39 The most 
effective language specifies a high quality level of education, while the 
least effective specifies a minimum quality level or none at all.40 
                                                     
 34. See REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS SCHOOL YEAR 2009–10 (FISCAL YEAR 2010), NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013307/tables/table_01.asp [hereinafter REVENUES 
AND EXPENDITURES]. Additionally, each state also receives federal funds. Id. The range of 
funding combinations varies significantly between states, with some relying more on local 
government revenues than others. See id. For example, in 2010, the share of local govern-
ment revenues ranged from a low of 4.6% (Vermont) to a high of 58.9% (Nevada) of the total 
education revenues. See id. It should be noted that not all districts have taxing authority, 
and those that do not rely on other local government entities such as city councils or county 
boards for revenue. Guthrie, supra note 29, at 133.  
 35. See Jim Fenwick, Funding Public Education: The Constitutionality of Relying 
on Local Property Taxes, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 517 (1998) (noting that almost 90% of education 
funding comes from property taxes). Reliance on property tax has been a major factor in 
recent education spending cuts because the decrease in real estate values associated with the 
real estate bubble collapse reduced the available revenue. Kristi L. Bowman, Before Districts 
Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 903 (2011). These budget 
cuts have led to a recent spate of education finance litigation. Id. at 912–13. 
 36. For some examples, see infra Part IV. Notably, district inequality was the very 
root of the equal protection claim in Rodriguez, discussed at supra Part I. After the United 
States Supreme Court held that education was not a fundamental right in Rodriguez, Texas 
plaintiffs continued to litigate the issue in the Texas court system through a series of cases 
that have become well known in school finance scholarship. J. Steven Farr & Mark 
Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 607, 608–09 (1999). 
 37. See Jensen, supra note 12, at 3. 
 38. See, e.g., Joki v. Meridian Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 11–12 (4th 
Jud. Dist. of Idaho Nov. 27, 2013) (unpublished memorandum decision) (on file with author) 
(“The [Idaho] Constitution does not mandate a particular level of funding or a particular 
funding mechanism.”). But cf COLO. CONST. art. IX § 17 (West, Westlaw current with 
amendments adopted through the Nov. 5, 2013 General Election) (providing for a minimum 
growth rate in education spending); MO. CONST. art. IX § 3(b) (West, Westlaw through the 
Nov. 6, 2012 General Election) (requiring a minimum percentage of annual state revenue to 
be set aside for education). For a fuller discussion of the Colorado and Missouri constitutions’ 
funding provisions, see infra Part III.D. 
 39. See Thro, supra note 19, at 25–27.  
 40. Jensen, supra note 12, at 6. 
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ii. Idaho’s Political Dynamics in Education Finance 
Idaho’s education clause proclaims, “[I]t shall be the duty of the 
[L]egislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and 
thorough system of public, free common schools."41 It is useful to distin-
guish between the Legislature’s bare duty to “establish and maintain” 
the system (what this Note calls the “duty phrase”), and the particular 
qualities (“general, uniform and thorough”) the system must have. The 
latter list of qualities is the clause’s “qualitative phrase.”42 
In Thompson, the Idaho Supreme Court implied that the duty to 
fund education abides in the Legislature’s dual mandate under the duty 
phrase to “establish and maintain” the education system.43 But, because 
of Idaho’s longstanding tradition of local education control, the Court 
was unwilling to find that this also required a statewide funding system 
and instead favored ongoing support from school districts.44 The system 
of education the Legislature establishes, then, is in practice maintained 
by the Legislature and the 115 Idaho school districts through a combi-
nation of general revenue transfers and districts’ property tax levies.45 
Meanwhile, the Legislature receives a great deal of deference from 
the judiciary in the details of the system the Legislature maintains.46 
The Court’s deference in this area extends beyond the Legislature’s 
choice of legislation and broaches an arena traditionally left exclusively 
to the judiciary: constitutional interpretation. Here, the critical example 
is the education clause’s requirement for a “thorough” system,47 which 
                                                     
 41. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legisla-
tion of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). 
 42. Jensen, supra note 12, at 4. 
 43. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 653, 96 Idaho 793, 811 (1975) (observing 
that the Legislature has a mandate to establish a system of “basic, thorough and uniform 
education,” and that the record did not show an “inadequacy of funding to maintain” that 
system).  
 44. See id. at 653, 96 Idaho at 811. The school districts had traditionally accom-
plished this through property tax levies. Id. at 653, 96 Idaho at 811. 
 45. Joki v. Meridian Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 12 (4th Jud. Dist. of 
Idaho Nov. 27. 2013) (unpublished memorandum decision) (on file with author) (“Idaho stat-
utes place the burden of actually providing this system [of schools] on the local school dis-
tricts and provide a funding mechanism for them.”); see also FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 10. 
It should also be noted that Idaho receives substantial federal funds; in the 2010 fiscal year, 
federal funds accounted for 20% of total elementary-secondary revenues. See REVENUES AND 
EXPENDITURES, supra note 34. 
 46. See Thompson, 537 P.2d at 658, 96 Idaho at 816 (“[T]he resolution of socio-
politico-educational policy decisions lie [sic] outside the ambit of our constitutional authority 
and within that of the [L]egislature.”). In general, judicial deference to legislative education 
policy is a major factor in education finance litigation. Amy L. Moore, When Enough Isn’t 
Enough: Qualitative and Quantitative Assessment of Adequate Education in State Constitu-
tions by State Supreme Courts, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 563 (2010) (noting that “[e]ven a 
court that wants to be an activist” still defers to legislative education policy formulation). 
 47. Going forward, this Note refers to this as the “thoroughness requirement.” Alt-
hough the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized its duty under the separation of powers doc-
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has been the focus of Idaho’s education finance litigation since ISEEO 
I.48 The Court has twice stated that the other branches’ definitions of 
thoroughness were consistent with the Court’s own view of thorough-
ness without clearly identifying how and without actually defining the 
word.49 Thus, unless a challenger can demonstrate that the Legisla-
ture’s definition of thorough is itself flawed, the Court has indicated 
that it will most likely adopt the Legislature’s definition.50 
The result is that the Legislature nearly has a two-fold corner on 
the how the education clause operates. Not only does the Legislature 
have plenary power to establish and maintain Idaho’s system of educa-
tion, but because of the deference the Court has given to the Legisla-
ture’s own meaning of “thoroughness,”51 the Legislature also has practi-
cal control over the most important standard by which its educational 
offerings are judged. This limits education reform because there may be 
a gap between the funding level the Legislature provides and the level 
actually needed to meet the system’s modern demands.52 
II. IDAHO’S SYSTEM OF EDUCATION FINANCE 
                                                                                                                           
trine to interpret the thoroughness requirement, it also recognized the need to involve both 
the legislative and executive branches, stating that it “was not equipped to legislate in a 
‘turbulent field of social, economic and political policy.’” ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 734, 123 
Idaho 573, 583 (1993). The Court went on to say that its duty had “been made simpler” be-
cause thoroughness had already been defined by the State Board of Education pursuant to 
the Legislature’s directive. Id. at 734, 123 Idaho at 583.  
 48. See ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 734, 123 Idaho at 583; ISEEO III, 976 P.2d 913, 919–
20, 132 Idaho 559, 565–66 (1998); ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1204, 142 Idaho 450, 460 (2005). 
 49. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 734, 123 Idaho at 583 (holding that the then-existing 
standards for thoroughness outlined in the State Board of Education Rules and Regulations 
for Public School K-12 were consistent with the Court’s own view of thoroughness); ISEEO 
III, 976 P.2d at 920, 132 Idaho at 566 (holding that new rules promulgated by the State 
Board of Education and the definition of thoroughness codified by the Legislature in I.C. § 
33-1612 were “consistent with [its] view of thoroughness with respect to facilities”). The Ida-
ho Supreme Court’s only positive definition of thoroughness is “that a safe environment con-
ducive to learning is inherently a part of a thorough system.” ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 920, 132 
Idaho at 566. But even that minimum standard was already well established by both the 
Idaho Legislature and the Idaho State Board of Education. See id. at 920, 132 Idaho 559 at 
566. Thus, the Court has had no essential role in defining thoroughness. 
 50. This is essentially the procedure lower courts have outlined for interpreting 
thoroughness. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 915, 132 Idaho at 561.  
 51. “A thorough system of public schools in Idaho is one in which: 1. A safe envi-
ronment conducive to learning is provided; 2. Educators are empowered to maintain class-
room discipline; 3. The basic values of honesty, self-discipline, unselfishness, respect for au-
thority and the central importance of work are emphasized; 4. The skills necessary to com-
municate effectively are taught; 5. A basic curriculum necessary to enable students to enter 
academic or professional-technical postsecondary educational programs is provided; 6. The 
skills necessary for students to enter the work force are taught; 7. The students are intro-
duced to current technology; and 8. The importance of students acquiring the skills to enable 
them to be responsible citizens of their homes, schools and communities is emphasized.” 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1612 (West, Westlaw current through emergency effective legislation 
of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). 
 52. See infra Part II.B. 
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Although the Idaho Supreme Court has given tremendous defer-
ence to the Legislature, Idaho’s education finance system was held un-
constitutional in ISEEO V at the end of 2005.53 This section examines 
the current funding scheme temporally: first, it evaluates the system 
the Court held unconstitutional; second, it evaluates the legislative re-
sponse to ISEEO V; and finally, it evaluates the post-ISEEO V litigation 
landscape. It concludes that Idaho’s public education system, while se-
verely underfunded,54 is, in practical terms, unchallengeable. 
A. Pre-ISEEO V 
Idaho policymakers have always been concerned with balancing the 
need for state-funded education with the state’s tradition of local educa-
tion control.55 Yet it was not until 1933 that the state actually recog-
nized an obligation to use general tax revenue to support public 
schools.56 Ultimately, there came to be an “informal rule” that about half 
of the state’s general fund would be appropriated for public schools.57 
                                                     
 53. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460. In the intervening time between 
ISEEO I and ISEEO V, the Court reviewed mootness, Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportuni-
ty v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ. (ISEEO II), 912 P.2d 644, 128 Idaho 276 (1996), and whether 
facilities funding had to be equalized and not subject to voter approval, ISEEO III, 976 P.2d 
913, 132 Idaho 559 (1998). Then, in 2004, the Court struck down a bill the Legislature enact-
ed in 2003 “directed specifically at the ISEEO case” and designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s 
cause of action. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State (ISEEO IV), 97 P.3d 453, 
459, 140 Idaho 586, 592 (2004). As discussed at infra Part II.D, this bill, which amended the 
Constitutionally-Based Educational Claims Act (CBECA), still requires plaintiffs to litigate 
the education system’s perceived deficiencies against the district first. Joki v. Meridian Sch. 
Dist. No. 2, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 4, 12 (4th Jud. Dist. of Idaho Nov. 27, 2013) (unpublished 
memorandum decision) (on file with author). 
 54. See, e.g., Clark Corbin, State Board Members Rip Luna’s K–12 Budget, 
IDAHOED NEWS (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.idahoednews.org/news/state-board-members-
rip-lunas-budget-proposal/ (“‘I don’t think anyone on the board or in the room would argue 
that we have adequately funded K–12 education.’”) (quoting State Board of Education mem-
ber and Task Force For Improving Education chairman Richard Westerberg); FERGUSON, 
supra note 6, at 6 (“This [reduction in public school spending as a percentage of personal 
income since 2000] is a stunning reduction in the state’s commitment to public schools.”); 
Scott Maben, Idaho Still Ranks Low on Education Spending, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 
22, 2013), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/may/22/idaho-still-ranks-low-on-
education-spending/ (“Idaho remains stuck near the bottom of public education funding, 
ranking second to last of all states in per-student spending for the third straight year.”). 
 55. This concern found its way into pre-statehood constitutional debates, continued 
as a major principle undergirding the Idaho Supreme Court’s Thompson decision, and re-
mains an ongoing consideration in the formulation of education policy by the State Board of 
Education. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 647, 650–53, 96 Idaho 793, 805, 808–11 
(1993); School Consolidation Could Save $15 Million, According to Luna, 
IDAHOREPORTER.COM (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.idahoreporter.com/2010/school-
consolidation-could-save-15-million-according-to-luna/ (reporting that State Superintendant 
Tom Luna does not want to make district consolidation mandatory, despite potential cost 
savings of $15 million). 
 56. Steve Guerber, Dir., Idaho State Historical Soc’y, A Brief History of Education 
in Idaho 8 (May 1, 1998), http:// 
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Even so, 1993 saw the release of a Needs Assessment Report com-
piled by a committee pursuant to 1991 legislation; the report indicated 
that 57% of Idaho’s public schools had serious safety problems.58 In the 
ramp-up to ISEEO V, the district court filled twelve of its forty-eight 
page findings with a list of severe, unresolved problems related to struc-
tural integrity, fire hazards, drainage, plumbing, and drinking water.59 
These findings, largely adopted by the Court in ISEEO V,60 were 
significant not only because of the quantity of evidence recounted, but 
also because they identified a source of the problem: some of the inflict-
ed facilities were in rural districts that had a declining property tax 
base and could simply not come up with the funds needed to finance 
their own capital improvements or replacements.61 The “glaring gap” the 
district court identified was a funding system that “lacked a mechanism 
to deal quickly with major, costly, potentially catastrophic conditions by 
districts which [were] low in population, [had] a low tax base, and [were] 
in economically depressed areas which [could not] fund the cost of total-
ly new construction.”62 
This funding gap had already been litigated under the uniformity 
requirement,63 which the Idaho Supreme Court made clear “requires 
only uniformity in curriculum, not uniformity in funding.”64 The consti-
tutional challenge in ISEEO V rested on the thoroughness require-
ment,65 though apparently an outgrowth of similar underlying inequali-
                                                                                                                           
www.sde.idaho.gov/site/schoolsbudget/docs/Guerber%20presentation%20to%20SBOE,%20M
ay%201998.pdf. 
 57. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 2. This rule persisted through the 1990s when 
health and welfare spending began to crowd out education spending. Id. at 24. 
 58. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, No. 94008, at 14 n.1, 15 (4th 
Jud. Dist. of Idaho Feb. 5, 2001), available at 
http://fourthjudicialcourt.idaho.gov/pdf/id_schools_decision.pdf (discussing the 1993 report). 
Ironically, ISEEO I was on appeal during a time of relative prosperity in education funding; 
in 1993, Idaho was spending 4.4% of its aggregate personal income on education—roughly in 
line with the previous ten-year average, and more than 1% higher than in 2013. FERGUSON, 
supra note 6, at 5 fig. 3. In 1992, this figure had been at a 33-year high of 4.8%. Id. at 5–6. 
 59. See Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity, No. 94008, at 3. Although citing 
only four districts as examples, the district court stated the problem was so widespread that 
the examples were only “illustrative.” Id. at 37–40. A 1999 follow-up to the 1993 report found 
that 53 of the buildings needing “serious and immediate attention in 1993 had deteriorated 
even further.” ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1205, 142 Idaho 450, 456 (2005). The Idaho Supreme 
Court found the list of concerns “distressingly long” and that the “overwhelming evidence . . . 
compel[led] the district court’s conclusion” that the system of funding at that time was con-
stitutionally inadequate under the thoroughness provision of the education clause. Id. at 
1205–06, 142 Idaho at 456–57. 
 60. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1208, 142 Idaho at 459 (“[T]he evidence in the record 
clearly supports the district court’s 2001 Findings.”). 
 61. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity, No. 94008, at 30. 
 62. Id. at 32. 
 63. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 636, 641, 96 Idaho 793, 794, 799 (1993); 
ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 731, 123 Idaho 573, 580 (1993). 
 64. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 730–31, 123 Idaho at 579–80. 
 65. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1202, 142 Idaho 450, 453 (2005). 
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ties.66 In theory, ISEEO V created an opportunity for the Court to flesh 
out the meaning of thoroughness. However, the complaint raised a very 
narrow aspect of thoroughness, alleging only that the State had failed to 
provide a thorough education by failing to provide safe facilities.67 The 
logic of the Court’s holding in ISEEO V was accordingly narrow: because 
the funding scheme failed to provide safe facilities to some districts, it 
also failed to meet the thoroughness requirement, but only insofar “as it 
relate[d] to school facilities.”68 The Court felt it had no reason to discuss 
the thoroughness of “course work and programming,”69 and thorough-
ness remains minimally defined as access to a “safe environment condu-
cive to learning.”70 
B. Legislative Response to ISEEO V 
The Court’s holding that the “method of funding as it relate[d] to 
school facilities” was inadequate had very specific concern: the system 
permitted a systemic underfunding of facility repair and replacement 
throughout the state.71 More precisely, the problem was the system’s 
reliance on borrowed funds to finance school repair and replacement.72 
In responding to this narrow holding, the Legislature passed the School 
Facilities Improvement Act (SFIA)73 during the 2006 regular session. 
                                                     
 66. Compare Thompson, 537 P.2d at 667, 96 Idaho at 825 (Donaldson, J., dissent-
ing), (“The poorer districts in the state cannot reach the funding levels of the wealthier dis-
tricts . . . .”), with ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1204, 142 Idaho at 455 (“Idaho’s schools, particularly 
those in rural areas, are stretched to the breaking point . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
 67. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1204, 142 Idaho 450 at 455 (“We again emphasize the 
current issues before the Court today relate solely to whether the Legislature has failed to 
provide an adequate means of funding school facilities.”); see also Joki v. Meridian Sch. Dist. 
No. 2, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 9 (4th Jud. Dist. of Idaho Nov. 27, 2013) (unpublished memo-
randum decision) (on file with author) (“ISEEO V dealt with in [sic] the narrow issue of fund-
ing for school facilities, not the education system as a whole.”). 
 68. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 458.  
 69. Id. at 1204, 142 Idaho at 455. 
 70. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d 913, 920, 132 Idaho 559, 566 (1998); see also supra note 49 
and accompanying text. 
 71. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460. 
 72. Id.; see also Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, No. 94008, at 31 
(4th Jud. Dist. of Idaho Feb. 5, 2001), available at 
http://fourthjudicialcourt.idaho.gov/pdf/id_schools_decision.pdf (noting that the only fund 
source for a new school at the time was a bond issue, which required a supermajority voter 
approval).  
 73. Safe Facilities Improvement Act, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 956 (2006). The SFIA 
offered these five provisions: (1) it provided for a stream of funds into the School District 
Building Account rather than just a one-time contribution; (2) it “remove[d] artificial limits” 
on the index used to calculate the amount of funds to which districts were entitled under the 
equalized levy program; (3) it added a measure to assist school districts that had unsafe facil-
ities but could not, through voter-approved levies, raise enough funds to remedy the problem; 
(4) it provided a system for state loans to districts to front the cost of repairs; and (5) it man-
dated that school districts begin setting aside funds for future facility needs. Id. 
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The SFIA was designed to meet with the Court’s assumption that the 
Legislature would “carry out its constitutional duties in good faith and 
in a timely manner.”74 
The Court has never said whether the SFIA corrected the system’s 
ills.75 The Court had made it clear that it was the Legislature’s respon-
sibility to fashion a remedy and retained jurisdiction over the case fol-
lowing ISEEO V in order to evaluate the Legislature’s “future . . . efforts 
to comply.”76 The Court has since issued a final order on the appeal—
with apparent preclusive effect77—but has given no explanation regard-
ing the remedy or final appeal.78 Procedurally, there is nothing to appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court because the plaintiffs won the case 
on the merits; meanwhile, a state district court cannot provide a remedy 
because the Idaho Supreme Court has retained jurisdiction.79 All of this 
has amounted to a very confusing and dissatisfying end to what would 
otherwise have been a significant plaintiffs’ victory.80 
Without more from the Court, it is hard to be certain that the SFIA 
adequately responded to ISEEO V.81 The plaintiffs’ attorney maintains 
                                                     
 74. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460; see also Safe Facilities Improve-
ment Act, § 1, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 956, 957–58 (2006). The stated purpose of the SFIA 
was “to fulfill the Legislature’s responsibility under [Idaho’s education clause], by establish-
ing an ongoing, state-funded system for funding repair or replacement of unsafe school facili-
ties in a manner that fairly and equitably balances the state and local contributions.” § 1(7), 
2006 Idaho Sess. Laws at 958. The Legislature had already introduced legislation in 2000 
designed to cure some of the problems later identified in the district court’s findings. ISEEO 
V, 129 P.3d at 1206, 142 Idaho at 457. That legislation provided funds for school facility re-
pair and replacement and established a method for inspecting facilities and increasing facili-
ty levy repayment terms to reduce payments. Id. But it was not enough to pass constitutional 
muster in ISEEO V because the Court did not see these as long-term solutions to such a 
systemic problem, nor could the Court entirely attribute to this legislation the progress made 
in bringing Idaho school facilities up to par. Id. at 1206–07, 142 Idaho at 457–58. 
 75. See Kress v. Copple-Trout, CV-07-261-S-BLW, 2008 WL 352620 (D. Idaho Feb. 
7, 2008), on reconsideration, CV-07-261-S-BLW, 2008 WL 2095602, at *3 (D. Idaho May 16, 
2008) (discussing the informal closing of the ISEEO V appeal and the Idaho Supreme Court’s 
lack of explanation after plaintiffs attempted to reopen the case to argue that the 2006 Legis-
lature did nothing during the regular session to comply). 
 76. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1208–09, 142 Idaho at 459–60. 
 77. Kress, 2008 WL 352620, at *3. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. (“Plaintiffs are seemingly stuck in limbo. They have succeeded on the 
merits before both the state district court and the Idaho Supreme Court. However, they have 
been neither granted nor expressly denied a remedy by the Idaho Supreme Court.”).   
 81. There is some evidence that the SFIA was an adequate legislative response, but 
it is murky. First are the specific provisions of the SFIA, which ensured a flow of funds into 
capital improvements from both general revenue and local revenue sources, and ensured 
that poor districts had access to resources for safe facilities even if local voters did not pass 
needed levies. Safe Facilities Improvement Act, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 956 (2006). These 
provisions appear to aim at the Court’s chief concern that the system did not provide enough 
funds for safe school facilities, particularly in districts that had a dire need for funds and 
could not get the voter approval needed to pass bond levies. See ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1203–
04, 142 Idaho at 454–55.  
Second, the approach taken by the Legislature roughly tracks some of the policies the 
Idaho Supreme Court referenced in ISSEO V. See ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 
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that the Legislature has done nothing to comply.82 But the State is 
budgeting more money for facilities,83 and a 2009 legislative report 
showed that superintendents, board members, and teachers ranked fa-
cilities as a less pressing need than salaries and benefits, discretionary 
spending, classrooms and textbooks, and technology.84 
Whatever the adequacy of the SFIA as a response to ISSEO V, this 
Note’s position is that the current system of education finance is still 
inadequate on the whole. There are many more aspects of a thorough 
education85 that are ignored when the Court and Legislature fixate on 
safe facilities. Thus, while facilities funding may have improved in the 
years since ISEEO V, those other aspects are still in need of attention—
                                                                                                                           
460. There, the Court listed policies other states had used to provide safe facilities, two of 
which were to create an emergency fund for the most urgent facility needs and to fund school 
facilities using general funds. Id. While the SFIA gives no indication whether its provisions 
had any root in the Court’s suggestions, the SFIA’s creation of the public school cooperative 
funding program employed these options. See Idaho Code Ann. § 33-909 (West, Westlaw 
current through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 
62nd Idaho Legislature enacted as of April 3, 2014); see also LEGIS. SERVS. OFF., STATE OF 
IDAHO: 2006 LEGISLATIVE FISCAL REPORT 5 (2006), [hereinafter 2006 LEGISLATIVE FISCAL 
REPORT], available at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/budget/publications/LFR/FY2007/FY2007LFR.pdf (discussing the 
first-ever appropriation from the General Fund into the bond levy equalization program, 
used to subsidize construction costs for the state’s poorest districts).     
The Court’s silence on the matter is inconclusive. One could argue that because the 
Court implied that it would oversee compliance with ISEEO V and then closed the case, 
Kress, 2008 WL 352620, at *3, this might suggest that the Court tacitly approved the legisla-
tive resolution through the SFIA. But if that was the case, why would the Court not have 
stated this expressly when it issued its final order? 
Ultimately, resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. The issue is dis-
cussed here to draw attention to an area of Idaho’s education finance litigation that is still 
shrouded in confusion, and which will need to be part of any policy discussion going forward. 
 82. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 26, at para. 37. 
 83. Compare, e.g., 2006 LEGISLATIVE FISCAL REPORT, supra note 81, § 1, at 3 (dis-
closing total facilities appropriations of $11,300,000 and $13,450,000 for fiscal years 2005 
and 2006, respectively), with LEGIS. SERVS. OFF., STATE OF IDAHO: 2008 LEGISLATIVE FISCAL 
REPORT § 1, at 3 (2008), available at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/budget/publications/LFR/FY2009/FY2009LFR.pdf (disclosing 
total facilities appropriations of $22,722,900 and $32,772,600 for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, 
respectively), and LEGIS. SERVS. OFF., STATE OF IDAHO: 2010 LEGISLATIVE FISCAL REPORT § 
1, at 3 (2010), available at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/budget/publications/LFR/FY2011/FY2011LFR.pdf (disclosing 
total facilities appropriations of $36,850,000 and $17,900,000 for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, 
respectively).  
 84. OFF. OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, IDAHO LEG., PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING 
IN IDAHO 63, 68 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter OFF. OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS], available at 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/ope/publications/reports/r0901.pdf. The poll also showed 
that stakeholders in urban districts saw facilities as a slightly more pressing need than did 
rural stakeholders. Id. at 70.  
 85. See, e.g., supra note 51 and text accompanying note 83.  
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more attention, at least, than a bill like the SFIA that leaves the overall 
structure of the funding system intact.86 
C. The 2006 Extraordinary Legislative Session and Beyond 
In August 2006, just months after the Legislature passed the SFIA, 
then-Governor Jim Risch called a special session of the Idaho Legisla-
ture.87 The product of this session was the Property Tax Relief Act,88 
which raised the Idaho sales tax 1% and eliminated the state property 
tax levy as a source of revenue supporting public school maintenance 
and operations (M&O).89 
The effect of the tax swap was to reduce the portion of education 
funding relying on the state’s property tax from roughly 25% to 10–
15%.90 To make up for the loss of state support, Idaho school districts 
have begun to increase funding through supplemental override levies.91 
Because these levies do not have the equalized quality of their state 
counterparts, there is evidence that their increased use is exacerbating 
disparities in funding capacity between districts.92 Although this has 
been argued to be a violation of yet another constitutional provision,93 
this specific claim has not been litigated.94 
                                                     
 86. The formula used to calculate how funds were distributed between districts was 
undisturbed by the SFIA. See OFF. OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, supra note 84, at x (stat-
ing that as of January 2009, the funding formula had not been changed since 1994). For a 
discussion of this formula, see Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, No. 94008, at 
43–45 (4th Jud. Dist. of Idaho Feb. 5, 2001), available at 
http://fourthjudicialcourt.idaho.gov/pdf/id_schools_decision.pdf. 
 87. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 6; House Revenue and Taxation Comm. Minutes, 
IDAHO DIGITAL PUBLICATIONS (Aug. 25, 2006), 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2006/standingcommittees/hrev0825min.pdf. 
 88. Property Tax Relief Act of 2006, 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (2006).  
 89. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 5. The estimated $210 million in new tax revenue 
generated from the sales tax increase was meant to replace the roughly $260 million from 
the property tax levy, the ultimate result being a reduction of $50 million in taxes. 2007 Ida-
ho Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (2006) at 4; FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 7. The tax-reduction 
measure received broad public support. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 7. 
 90. See FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 6 fig. 4 (demonstrating graphically the reduc-
tion in reliance on property taxes since the change made in 2006). 
 91. Id. at 9. 
 92. Id. at 16–19 (demonstrating that the increased reliance on unequalized supple-
mental override levies requires less taxing effort by a wealthy district compared to a poor 
district in order to raise the same dollar of levied funds). The difference between equalized 
and unequalized levies is that the former has an adjustment mechanism to account for the 
funding capacity disparities resulting from differences in taxable property value. Id. at 1 n.2. 
 93. Id. at 17. The argument is that the increased reliance on local supplemental lev-
ies violates the uniform tax provision in article VII, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution. Id. 
This provision requires that taxes be “uniform upon the same class of subjects within the 
territorial limits.” IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 5 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective 
legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). Because these 
supplemental override levies are unequalized, a wealthy district with high property values 
can tax its citizens at a lower rate than a district with a comparatively low property value, 
yet still raise the same amount of funds. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 17. For example, a resi-
dent of the Pocatello school district would have to be taxed at a rate of over 3.4 times higher 
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More importantly, as has already been discussed, the Court contin-
ues to hold that such disparities are not prohibited by the uniformity 
provision in the education clause.95 In light of this precedent, drastic 
differences in funding capacity between districts simply do not appear to 
create a constitutional problem. The only known exception is if those 
disparities prevent poorer districts from having access to safe facilities 
conducive to learning, as in ISEEO V. 
D. “Free” Education Under the Idaho Education Clause 
Since ISEEO V, further attempts to declare the overall system of 
education funding inadequate have not succeeded.96 Recently, a former 
school district superintendent brought suit claiming districts violated 
the “free common schools” provision of the education clause by charging 
registration fees.97 The suit included a second cause of action that the 
State was inadequately funding education;98 essentially, the plaintiffs 
sought a declaratory judgment that “the [L]egislature has not corrected 
the system found deficient in [ISEEO V].”99 The complaint makes it 
clear that the lawsuit was an outgrowth of perceived ongoing and severe 
education funding problems in Idaho, by suggesting that the underfund-
ing is the reason districts have to charge registration fees in the first 
place.100 
This second cause of action was dismissed by the district court, 
based on the complaint’s failure to “touch[] upon the adequacy of any 
facilit[y].”101 The district court acknowledged the narrowness of the 
ISEEO V holding and observed that without alleging a problem related 
to school facilities, there was no claim to support relief.102 The district 
court also noted that even if the complaint had invoked facts sufficient 
                                                                                                                           
than a resident of the Coeur d’ Alene district in order to raise the same dollar of revenue, as 
a result of the Coeur d’ Alene district’s thrice higher taxable property value. See id. at 12 tbl. 
2 (compiling figures useful for calculating the tax rate differential). 
 94. But see Sch. Dist. No. 25, Bannock Cnty. v. State Tax Comm’n, 612 P.2d 126, 
133, 101 Idaho 283, 290 (1980) (holding that article VII, section 5 is not violated unless the 
method used to value the property within a tax district somehow varies arbitrarily between 
classes of subjects within that district). 
 95. See supra Part II.A. 
 96. Following ISEEO V, the plaintiffs sought to reopen the case on the grounds that 
the Legislature did nothing in 2006 to cure the funding defects, which resulted in the proce-
dural “limbo” discussed at supra Part II.B. See Kress v. Copple-Trout, CV-07-261-S-BLW, 
2008 WL 352620 (D. Idaho Feb. 7, 2008), on reconsideration, CV-07-261-S-BLW, 2008 WL 
2095602 (D. Idaho May 16, 2008).  
 97. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 26, at para. 1–2. 
 98. Id. at para. 2, 41. 
 99. Joki v. Meridian Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 9 (4th Jud. Dist. of 
Idaho Nov. 27, 2013) (unpublished memorandum decision) (on file with author). 
100. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 26, at para. 2. 
101. Joki, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 10. 
102. Id. 
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to piggyback ISEEO V, the Court would have still pared down the class 
action because, under the Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act 
(CBECA),103 the litigation had to start against the plaintiff’s local school 
district.104 
This case illustrates the ongoing dissatisfaction with Idaho’s educa-
tion funding system, and the perception that the alleged violation of the 
“free” requirement is symptomatic of persistent underfunding. It also 
demonstrates the difficulties a challenger faces because of the CBECA’s 
local-district-first requirement and how insulated the State is from a 
declaration of inadequate funding.105 At this point, and in light of the 
setbacks to the “free” clause litigation, at least as far as overall funding 
adequacy is concerned, it seems plaintiffs wanting to challenge the fund-
ing system are out of feasible options. 
III. SOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
Taking the words of the education clause one at a time shows that 
the clause’s effectiveness for reform has been exhausted. First, because 
district disparities do not violate the uniformity requirement, this re-
quirement does not support a funding challenge even though such dis-
parities persist.106 Second, even if the SFIA did not sufficiently address 
the facilities problem underlying ISEEO V, a further remedy addressing 
system-wide inadequacy at this stage is unlikely.107 Finally, a challenge 
to funding adequacy through the education clause’s “free” provision, and 
by reviving ISEEO V, appears to suffer from procedural limitations.108 
In any case, the CBECA poses a serious obstacle to a broad inadequacy 
claim against the State.109 
How can Idaho public schools get the funding they need? One solu-
tion involves a change more fundamental than a judicial decision or a 
legislative funding package: an amendment to the Idaho Constitution.110 
                                                     
103. Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 845 
(1996) (current version at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2215 (2009 & Supp. 2013)). For more context 
on the 2003 amendments to this Act held unconstitutional in ISEEO IV, see Robert C. Hunt-
ley, Public Education School Funding Litigation in Idaho: A Tale of Legislative Irresponsibil-
ity and Delay, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 247, 258–61 (2005). 
104. Joki, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 11. Although amendments to the CBECA were 
struck down in ISEEO IV, the core provision still applies to claims raised after 2003. Id.; see 
also supra note 53. 
105. See Joki, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 12 (“Plaintiffs . . . must exhaust their reme-
dies under CEBECA [sic] before pursuing a general declaration that the entire school fund-
ing system in Idaho is unconstitutional.”). 
106. See supra Part II.A. 
107. See supra Part II.B. 
108. See supra Part II.D. 
109. See id. 
110. An Idaho court also made the suggestion that Idaho voters could change the 
state’s constitution if they wanted a more explicit funding method than the Idaho Constitu-
tion provided. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d 913, 918, 132 Idaho 559, 564 (1998) (quoting the trial 
court). Furthermore, one scholar acknowledges that “[a]n argument can be made that states 
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There are good reasons why Idaho legislators should embrace 
amendment and why Idaho voters should pressure them to do so. A 
bolder mandate in Idaho’s highest education law would likely spur im-
mediate improvements, because under the duty phrase, the Legislature 
would be obligated to increase funding to “establish and maintain” the 
more exacting provisions of the amended clause. An amendment would 
also support improvements if future plaintiffs again have to resort to the 
judicial process to goad the Legislature into compliance. The Idaho Su-
preme Court would then have the opportunity—or duty—to issue more 
robust pronouncements as it interprets the new language. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, amended language would 
improve the state’s overall attitude toward education by prioritizing it. 
This, in turn, might impel a future Idaho judiciary to take a more asser-
tive and transparent approach to protecting education, and to afford a 
clear and meaningful remedy if the Legislature fails to fund education 
adequately. 
Admittedly, this solution has obstacles. Primarily, Idaho voters 
cannot directly amend their constitution through initiative,111 as can 
voters in some states.112 Instead, the amendment process requires a 
proposal by either chamber of the Idaho Legislature, followed by a su-
permajority vote of both houses; alternatively, two-thirds of both cham-
bers can call a constitutional convention, which must then be submitted 
to the electorate at the next general election.113 Since both options re-
quire participation by the very political body presiding over the current 
reduction in financial commitment to education, one might be justly 
skeptical of this solution. Even so, if the Legislature did propose an 
amendment, only a majority of Idaho voters have to approve it before it 
                                                                                                                           
should amend their constitutions, where necessary, to reflect the state’s actual concern and 
support for education.” Jensen, supra note 12, at 42. 
111. See IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective leg-
islation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature) (“Any amendment 
or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the [L]egislature.”); 
IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 3 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legislation of the 
2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature) (“Whenever two-thirds of the 
members elected to each branch of the legislature shall deem it necessary to call a convention 
to revise or amend this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next 
general election.”); JAMES BENJAMIN WEATHERBY ET AL., GOVERNING IDAHO: POLITICS, 
PEOPLE AND POWER 82 (2005). 
112. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2) (West, Westlaw current with amendments 
adopted through the Nov. 5, 2013 General Election); MO. CONST. art. III, § 50 (West, 
Westlaw through the Nov. 6, 2012 General Election; INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT THE 
UNIV. OF S. CAL., COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESSES, 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Req
uirements/A%20Comparison%20of%20Statewide%20I&R%20Processes.pdf (last visited June 
29, 2014). 
113. IDAHO CONST. art. XX, §§ 1, 3 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective leg-
islation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). 
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can take effect.114 Thus, the main battle is pressuring the Legislature to 
take action. 
Beyond the procedural hurdle, the Idaho Supreme Court’s handling 
of the ISEEO V remedy calls into question whether a future win for 
plaintiffs would matter. That is, unless the Court is willing to assert a 
stronger role in overseeing the legislative response to a future finding of 
inadequate education funding, plaintiffs may face another hollow victo-
ry. 
Despite these obstacles, constitutional amendment is the right ap-
proach chiefly because, as this Note has pointed out, it appears to be the 
only remaining approach. More importantly, if phrased properly, an 
amendment could actually heighten the Legislature’s duty to provide for 
education, and, at the same time, steer the Idaho Supreme Court toward 
a stronger interpretive approach that is less deferential to the Legisla-
ture and more protective of education. 
IV. COMPARATIVE STATE ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
The suggestion for constitutional amendment raises the question: 
exactly how should the Idaho Constitution be amended? In answering 
the question, it becomes highly relevant how other states have dealt 
with the issue and interpreted similar constitutional provisions.115 
This Note takes a comparative approach to identify what changes 
could improve Idaho’s education clause and, in turn, improve education 
funding. Because more comprehensive surveys of education clauses and 
associated litigation already exist,116 such an approach is neither neces-
sary nor desirable here. This Note does not intend to exhaust the possi-
ble options for amended language but rather to offer one solution that 
could yield improvements in Idaho. 
It is worth justifying why Idaho should look to other states’ clauses 
to improve its own. First, the variations between state education clauses 
and the educational offerings in those states provide natural bases for 
comparing the relative duties states owe their citizens, and the resulting 
outcomes.117 Combined with the long history and high volume of litiga-
tion in this area,118 these comparisons illustrate how educational offer-
ings have been affected by the various permutations of education clause 
                                                     
114. IDAHO CONST. art. XX, §§ 1, 4 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective leg-
islation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). 
115. See Thro, supra note 19, at 22. 
116. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 12; Moore, supra note 46; Thro, supra note 19. 
117. Thro, supra note 19, at 31.  
118. Education finance litigation is now in its forty-first year; scholars credit Robin-
son v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) with at least partially starting the cascade of litiga-
tion. Thro, supra note 19, at 19. 
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language,119 which is useful in isolating and examining the effectiveness 
of individual words. 
Second, the Idaho Supreme Court has hinted that it values other 
states’ interpretations and applications of their education clauses.120 
The Court discussed four states’ interpretations in Thompson, largely 
adopting Washington’s definition of “general and uniform.”121 Also, the 
Court observed in ISEEO V that four other states had developed financ-
ing schemes to “assist school districts in providing a safe environment 
conducive to learning.”122 Other state high courts can be persuasive, and 
their interpretations of similar language deserve consideration. 
Comparisons have limitations. Most notably, each state has politi-
cal, historical, or cultural uniqueness that makes exact comparisons un-
sound.123 Similarly, each constitutional challenge within a jurisdiction 
has comparison-confounding idiosyncrasies. A court’s interpretation of 
language may change over time,124 and even consistent interpretations 
may be applied differently at different times or in different circumstanc-
es.125 
                                                     
119. Particularly, education clauses have been an integral part of successful litiga-
tion and the quality of education offered in states after that litigation. Jensen, supra note 12, 
at 3–4. 
120. The Idaho Supreme Court is not unique in this regard; many state high courts 
look to how other states have interpreted their education clauses. See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 
505 N.W.2d 299, 310–12 (Minn. 1993) (discussing eight states’ interpretations of different 
education clause provisions).  
121. The Washington Supreme Court had ruled that “[a] general and uniform sys-
tem, that is, a system which, within reasonable constitutional limits of equality, makes am-
ple provision for the education of all children, cannot be based upon exact equality of funding 
per child because it takes more money in some districts per child to provide about the same 
level of educational opportunity than it does in others.” Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 
635, 652, 96 Idaho 793, 810 (1975) (quoting Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 
P.2d 178, 202 (Wash. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King 
Cnty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978)). The Idaho Supreme Court also discussed Arizona, 
California, and New Jersey in its Thompson decision. Id. at 651, 96 Idaho at 809. 
122. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1209, 142 Idaho 450, 460 (2005) (surveying legislation 
in Hawaii, Kansas, New Jersey, and North Carolina). 
123. See, e.g., C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excel-
lence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 599, 610 (1995) (noting that Ken-
tucky’s education reform may have been a function of the state’s “paradoxical nature”); Farr 
& Trachtenberg, supra note 36, at 616–18 (identifying four unique factors shaping Texas’s 
education reform). 
124. The Texas Supreme Court, for example, initially held that “efficiency” was a 
near absolute standard, requiring “direct and close correlation between a district’s tax effort 
and the educational resources available to it,” and “substantially equal access to similar rev-
enues per pupil.” Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 
1989). The Texas Supreme Court used the “wiggle room” in this language to soften its ap-
proach in later litigation. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 36, at 693. 
125. See, e.g., ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 735 n.2, 123 Idaho 573, 584 n.2 (1993) (“Our 
holding of the consistency of the IDAPA standards, [sic] with a definition of thoroughness is 
limited to the standards as they exist today. We express no opinion as to whether the IDAPA 
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While these limitations caution against over-simplification and 
generalization, there is still value in understanding how other high 
courts have dealt with similar constitutional challenges. To capitalize on 
this value, this Note mitigates the potential downsides in two ways. 
First, it points out where limitations apply and how they should temper 
predictions for Idaho. Second, it filters the states used for comparison to 
the most relevant examples. In choosing the examples, this Note consid-
ers factors such as: the success of education reform in that state, wheth-
er language from that state’s education clause might have influenced 
Idaho’s education finance jurisprudence if it had been part of Idaho’s 
education clause, and the degree of similarity between that state and 
Idaho in terms of education finance systems and key litigation facts. 
B. Prioritizing Education 
i. Making Education a Fundamental Right 
Before comparing specific education clause provisions, however, a 
more general difference between Idaho’s education system and those in 
other states deals with whether the right to education is fundamental 
under the state constitution as a whole. 
With Thompson, Idaho joined a host of states holding that educa-
tion is not a fundamental right.126 Courts in these states are more defer-
ential to legislatures, and less likely to strike down education finance 
systems.127 A plaintiff challenging an education finance system would 
prefer education be ascribed fundamental status, because that typically 
calls for strict scrutiny protection.128 Strict scrutiny, in turn, involves 
less deference to legislatures.129 In some states, courts have even com-
bined strict scrutiny with adequacy requirements, declaring not only the 
right to education fundamental, but the right to an adequate education 
fundamental.130 In New Hampshire’s Claremont School District v. Gov-
ernor (Claremont II), for example, this approach led the New Hampshire 
                                                                                                                           
standards would be consistent with that definition if the Board of Education were to amend 
them.”). 
126. Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional 
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (1992). For a list of states in which education is a funda-
mental right, see Ken Gormley, Education as a Fundamental Right: Building a New Para-
digm, 2 F. ON PUB. POL’Y 207, 219 n.63 (2006). 
127. Hubsch, supra note 126, at 1334.  
128. See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitu-
tional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 431 (2000). Under strict scruti-
ny, laws must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest,” where 
rational basis review only requires a “reasonable [relationship] to a legitimate government 
interest.” Id. at 406. These standards of review operate in examinations of rights under the 
United States Constitution, and most states adopt the same approach in examinations of 
rights under their own constitutions. Gormley, supra note 126, at 224.   
129. See Gormley, supra note 126, at 224. 
130. Cochran, supra note 128, at 417 n.91 (citing Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) as an example). 
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Supreme Court to adopt the standards discussed in Part IV.C.ii, as 
“benchmarks of a constitutionally adequate public education” that the 
New Hampshire Legislature needed to implement.131 Notably, “adequa-
cy” does not appear in the New Hampshire education clause,132 so 
Claremont II is remarkable in essentially reading that requirement into 
the New Hampshire government’s duty to provide education. 
Unfortunately, the Idaho Supreme Court has held education is not 
a fundamental right because the Idaho Constitution expresses it as a 
legislative duty and not as a positive right.133 Therefore, in a challenge 
to the Idaho education finance system, plaintiffs must contend with ra-
tional basis review,134 under which the Legislature receives the highest 
level of deference.135 Because Idaho’s constitution lacks the positive 
phrasing regarding education, challengers also lack the “strong[] textual 
basis for arguing that [their] government [has] a duty to provide support 
for . . . public education.”136 
ii. Paramountcy 
Washington’s education clause, in part, announces that it is the 
“paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education 
of all children.”137 The duty this language imposes is unique, particular-
ly the coupling of “paramount duty” with “ample provision.”138 This 
heightened standard makes Washington’s clause ideal for a constitu-
tional challenge.139 
Washington’s Supreme Court has reviewed the overall adequacy of 
education funding twice.140 In Seattle School District No. 1 of King 
County v. Washington, the state’s supreme court held that the para-
                                                     
131. Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997). 
132. See N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (West, Westlaw updated with laws current through 
Chapter 7 of the 2014 Reg. Sess., not including changes and corrections made by the State of New Hamp-
shire, Office of Legislative Services). 
133. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 733–34, 123 Idaho 573, 582–83 (1993). For a discussion 
on positive rights in state constitutions, see Cochran, supra note 128, at 431. 
134. See ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 734, 123 Idaho at 583 (discussing application of the 
rational basis test as the proper standard of review where no fundamental right or suspect 
class is involved). 
135. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
136. Cochran, supra note 128, at 431. 
137. WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (West, Westlaw current through amendments ap-
proved 11-5-2013). 
138. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 
1978). 
139. Jensen, supra note 12, at 5–6. Scholars who have categorized education clauses 
according to the level of duty imposed on the state legislature have identified Washington’s 
education clause as a Category IV (highest) example. Thro, supra note 19, at 22–24, 25 n.38 
(summarizing categories outlined by Professors Grubb and Ratner and highlighting Wash-
ington as a Category IV example). 
140. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 230 (Wash. 2012). 
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mount duty-ample provision was not a mere preamble, but imposed an 
affirmative duty on the Washington Legislature.141 In so holding, the 
Washington Supreme Court recognized not only this duty, but a “correl-
ative right” of “equal [paramount] stature.”142 This means all Washing-
ton children enjoy a right to an amply provided education.143 The Wash-
ington Legislature has recently been criticized for failing to discharge its 
duty,144 but the initial result of Seattle School District was a substantial 
increase in education funding.145 
McCleary v. State146 was in many ways Seattle School District re-
dux. In McCleary, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed the Wash-
ington Legislature’s 2009 education reform package, and held that if 
fully funded, the system would be constitutional.147 Noting that the 
state’s overall K-12 funding experienced drastic cuts in the 2011–2013 
operating budgets, the Court went on to hold that the Legislature failed 
to meet its duty by “consistently providing school districts with a level of 
resources that [fell] short of the actual costs of the basic education pro-
gram.”148 The Court retained jurisdiction to monitor the Legislature’s 
progress, imposing a 2018 deadline.149 As part of the Court’s remedial 
oversight, the Legislature must report its progress towards the goals 
outlined in McCleary.150 
Washington’s jurisprudence in this area is important because it has 
influenced Idaho’s,151 and because the facts underlying both states’ edu-
cation finance litigation are similar.152 However, the two states’ high 
                                                     
141. Seattle Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d at 91. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See Daniel C. Stallings, Washington State’s Duty to Fund K-12 Schools: Where 
the Legislature Went Wrong and What It Should Do to Meet Its Constitutional Obligation, 
85 WASH. L. REV. 575, 591–92 (2010).  
145. Washington: Major Cases, EDUC. JUSTICE, 
http://www.educationjustice.org/states/washington (last visited June 29, 2014); see also Jen-
sen, supra note 12, at 22. 
146. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 230 (Wash. 2012). 
147. Id. at 231. 
148. Id. at 261. 
149. Id. 
150. See John Stang, Legislature Wonders if Supreme Court Will Accept its Home-
work Assignment, CROSSCUT.COM (Aug. 2, 2013), http://crosscut.com/2013/08/02/olympia-
2013/115807/legislature-wonders-if-supreme-court-will-accept-i/. 
151. The Idaho Supreme Court used an early Washington equity case, Northshore 
Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974), to support its holding in Thompson 
that a general and uniform system did not require equal per-pupil funding. Thompson v. 
Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 652, 96 Idaho 793, 810 (1975). The Court also adopted Washing-
ton’s definition of “general and uniform.” See supra note 121 and accompanying text. In 
ISEEO III, the Court distinguished Seattle School District because that case involved the 
unique “paramount duty” provision, and was therefore inapplicable. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d 
913, 920–21, 132 Idaho 559, 566–67 (1998); see also infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
152. For instance, both high courts have been called on to resolve equity cases aris-
ing from districts’ disparate property values. Compare, e.g., Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417, 
530 P.2d at 181 (noting that the petitioner’s arguments included equal protection claims 
resulting from lower assessed property values, and allegations that the legislature had failed 
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courts came to different conclusions on analogous arguments related to 
financial support of education through voter-approved tax levies.153 In 
ISEEO III, the plaintiffs argued that submitting override levies to vot-
ers violated Idaho’s constitutional requirement for thoroughness—an 
argument parallel to that raised by the Seattle School District plain-
tiffs.154 The Idaho Supreme Court distinguished Seattle School District 
on the basis that in Idaho, providing education is not the Legislature’s 
paramount duty.155 This implies that had there been a paramount duty 
provision, the argument against voter-approved levies might have suc-
ceeded. This would have forced the Idaho Legislature to reexamine the 
relative composition of state and local revenues, and the reliance on 
supplemental override levies currently giving rise to even greater dis-
parities156 may never have materialized. 
More generally, Washington illustrates how a higher constitutional 
standard for education could improve judicial oversight in Idaho. The 
Washington Supreme Court’s handling of the remedy in McCleary—
imposing a deadline for the Legislature and requiring progress re-
ports157—seems to be a natural outgrowth of the high regard for educa-
tion created by the language of the Washington Constitution.158 Com-
pared with the confusion besmirching the Idaho Supreme Court’s reten-
tion of jurisdiction following ISEEO V,159 the Washington judiciary’s 
commitment to post-McCleary oversight is a model of clarity and asser-
tiveness. If Idaho’s constitution held the Legislature to a paramount du-
                                                                                                                           
to provide a general and uniform education system), with Thompson, 537 P.2d at 636–37, 96 
Idaho at 794–95 (summarizing its holding that Idaho’s system did not violate equal protec-
tion nor the uniformity requirement even though there were disparities in per-pupil re-
sources as a result of the state’s reliance on property taxes), and ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 729, 
123 Idaho 573, 578 (1993) (discussing a portion of the complaint that “alleged that the dis-
parities in funding caused by the property-tax system results in a system that does not pro-
vide a uniform education and violates the equal protection clause”). Both high courts have 
also dealt with complaints against levy schemes that ultimately raised adequacy concerns. 
Compare Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 97 (Wash. 1978) 
(holding that a constitutional system requires funds to be raised through “dependable and 
regular tax sources”), with ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1203, 142 Idaho 450, 454 (2005) (agree-
ing with the trial court’s finding that a system relying on loans for funding was unconstitu-
tional). 
153. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 917, 132 Idaho at 563; Seattle Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d at 78. 
154. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 920, 132 Idaho at 566. Voter-approved levies can create 
funding shortfalls because voters may not approve them, leaving districts starved for funds. 
See FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 17. 
155. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 920–21, 132 Idaho at 566–67. 
156. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 149–50. 
158. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 261 (Wash. 2012) (“This court cannot idly 
stand by as the legislature makes unfulfilled promises for reform. . . . A better way forward is 
for the judiciary to retain jurisdiction over this case to monitor . . . the State’s compliance 
with its paramount duty.”) (emphasis added). 
159. See supra Part II.B. 
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ty to provide education, perhaps the Idaho Supreme Court would have 
likewise felt compelled to oversee the Legislature’s ISEEO V remedy, or 
at the very least articulate whether the SFIA was indeed a sufficient 
legislative response.160 
The Washington example supports the commonsense notion that a 
lofty education clause may inspire a government to provide high-quality 
education.161 A constitutional requirement prioritizing education over 
other legislative agendas can channel more energy, focus, and resources 
into education.162 Because the opposite seems to be happening in Ida-
ho,163 language similar to that in article IX of the Washington Constitu-
tion164 could positively impact Idaho’s education finance. 
C. An “Efficiency” Requirement 
The Idaho education clause’s qualitative phrase specifies that the 
Legislature must establish and maintain “a general, uniform and thor-
ough system of public, free common schools.”165 Taken individually, 
these words are not particularly unique; eight state constitutions re-
quire generality,166 eight require uniformity,167 and seven require thor-
                                                     
160. See generally supra Part II.B. 
161. But see Gormley, supra note 126, at 224 (“‘[S]trong’ education provisions do not 
necessarily produce strong judicial interpretations of those provisions.”); Jensen, supra note 
12, at 40–41 (noting the corollary that low-standard education clauses do not necessarily 
produce sub-par funding). 
162. See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 249 (“‘[P]aramount’ means the State must ‘amply 
provide for the education of all Washington children as the State’s first and highest priority 
before any other State programs or operations.’”) (quoting and affirming the trial court’s 
definition of paramount). 
163. See generally FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 1–5 (discussing the reduction in Ida-
ho’s financial support of education over a twenty-three year period, and the crowding out of 
education spending by health and welfare spending).  
164. See supra text accompanying note 137. 
165. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legisla-
tion of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). 
166. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective April 
30, 2014 of the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-first Legislature); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 
(West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014, ch. 227); IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (West, Westlaw cur-
rent with all legislation of the Second Regular Session of the 118th General Assembly (2014) 
with effective dates through May 1, 2014); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw cur-
rent with legislation of the 2014 Regular Session effective through May 15, 2014); N.C. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Regular Session of the 
General Assembly); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 6, 2012, General 
Election); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Regular Session and 
Supreme Court Rule 13-17); WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2 (West, Westlaw current through 
amendments approved 11-5-2013). 
167. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective April 
30, 2014 of the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-first Legislature); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 
2 (West, Westlaw current with amendments adopted through the Nov. 5, 2013 General Elec-
tion); IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the Second Regu-
lar Session of the 118th General Assembly (2014) with effective dates through May 1, 2014); 
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw current with legislation of the 2014 Regular Ses-
sion effective through May 15, 2014); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) (West, Westlaw through the 
end of the 2013 Regular Session of the General Assembly); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (West, 
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oughness.168 But Idaho’s is the only clause requiring all three.169 Seven 
states with clauses containing at least one of either “general,” “uniform,” 
or “thorough” combine that requirement in hendiadys-type170 phrases 
with “efficiency,”171 and three others require efficiency in some stand-
alone context.172 All told, then, efficiency is a requirement in 20% of the 
states.173 
Of the many plain meanings of “efficiency,” one is the “use of re-
sources so as to produce results of little waste.”174 Budget shortfalls and 
dismal prognoses for school financing in upcoming years have already 
made this concept a relevant consideration for policymakers.175 Moreo-
                                                                                                                           
Westlaw through Nov. 6, 2012, General Election); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw 
through the 2013 Regular Session and Supreme Court Rule 13-17); WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2 
(West, Westlaw current through amendments approved 11-5-2013); WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1 
(West, Westlaw through amendments approved by the voters on November 6, 2012).  
168. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (West, Westlaw current with amendments adopt-
ed through the Nov. 5, 2013 General Election); MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw 
through chapters effective May 15, 2014, of the 2014 Regular Session of the General Assem-
bly); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw current with legislation of the 2014 Regular 
Session effective through May 15, 2014); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (West, Westlaw 
through amendments approved at Nov. 5, 2013 election); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (West, 
Westlaw through files 1 to 94 and statewide issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)); PA. CONST. 
art. III, § 14 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Regular Session Acts 1 to 21, 23 to 36 and 38 to 
40); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (West, Westlaw current with laws of the 2014 Regular and 
First Ex. Sess. with effective dates through June 2, 2014).  
169. See IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective leg-
islation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature); Moore, supra 
note 46, at 561 n.142. 
170. Hendiadys literally means “one through two”; it is a pair of words separated by 
“and” that expresses one idea. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 540 (10th ed. 
1993). Generally the device combines words that could also be combined as an independent 
word and modifier (an example is the hendiadys “nice and warm” instead of “nicely warm”). 
Id. For analytical purposes, and for lack of a better term, this Note categorizes phrases such 
as “thorough and efficient” as hendiadyses when courts interpret them as a single concept, 
even though the courts and literature have not discussed them this way. 
171. See DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014, ch. 227); 
MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through chapters effective May 15, 2014, of the 
2014 Regular Session of the General Assembly); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw 
current with legislation of the 2014 Regular Session effective through May 15, 2014); N.J. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (West, Westlaw through amendments approved at Nov. 5, 2013 
election); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (West, Westlaw through files 1 to 94 and statewide issue 1 
of the 130th GA (2013-2014)); PA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Regular 
Session Acts 1 to 21, 23 to 36 and 38 to 40); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (West, Westlaw cur-
rent with laws of the 2014 Regular and First Ex. Sess. with effective dates through June 2, 
2014); Moore, supra note 46, at 561 n.142.  
172. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (West, Westlaw current through 4/1/2014) (“efficient sys-
tem of high quality”); KY. CONST. § 183 (West, Westlaw current with emergency effective 
legislation through the 2014 Regular Session) (“an efficient system of common schools”); TEX. 
CONST. art. VII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 
83rd Legislature) (“an efficient system of public free schools”). 
173.  See sources cited supra notes 171–72.  
174.    Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex. 1989). 
175. Moore, supra note 46, at 563–564. 
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ver, education finance challenges based on efficiency requirements lend 
themselves to a type of hybrid adequacy argument that courts tend to 
find persuasive.176 Finally, some states that have had successful educa-
tion reform177 have efficiency in their education clauses.178 These are all 
reasons why Idaho education finance might benefit from an efficiency 
requirement. 
There is another reason: Idaho’s qualitative phrase specifies the 
type of education system the Legislature must establish and maintain, 
but as a whole, the education clause fails to address how the Legislature 
should do so.179 This leaves much to legislative discretion, and there has 
been little to check the Idaho Legislature’s understanding and admin-
istration of the education clause.180 An efficiency requirement provides 
an important link between all ends (outputs) required by the qualitative 
phrase, and a legislature’s chosen means (inputs).181 Providing safe fa-
cilities is only one of these inputs—an efficiency requirement would give 
the Court cause to examine all of the Idaho Legislature’s educational 
inputs.182 
In some of the efficiency states where education clause challenges 
are justiciable,183 judicial interpretations of the term can be broadly 
grouped into one of three overlapping yet analytically distinct interpre-
tive models: first are those that associate efficiency with an objective, 
                                                     
176. Jensen, supra note 12, at 27. “A hybrid suit combines the equal protec-
tion/equality claim with the education clause/adequacy claim.” Id. Edgewood I, discussed at 
infra Part IV.C.i, was a hybrid suit. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397; Jensen, supra note 12, 
at 31. For context on equity and adequacy claims, see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
177. Kentucky, New Jersey, and Texas have been identified as states that have “set 
new and higher standards” for education funding, at least in terms of equity. Charles S. Ben-
son, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New Jersey, and Kentucky, 28 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 401, 401 (1991). 
178. Thro, supra note 19, at 27 & n.58 (comparing the lack of plaintiff victories based 
on the word “uniform” with the relatively significant number of plaintiff victories based on 
the word “efficient”).  
179. Joki v. Meridian Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. CV-OC-1217745, at 11 (4th Jud. Dist. of 
Idaho Nov. 27, 2013) (unpublished memorandum decision) (on file with author). 
180. See supra Part I.A.ii. 
181. See Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: Looking Backward 
and Forward through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 411, 432 (2008) (observ-
ing that “efficient system” language constitutes a bridge between educational inputs like 
funding, and outputs like student performance). Efficiency “literally can encompass every-
thing that goes on in the educational process.” Id. 
182. Alternatively, even an output-oriented approach to an efficiency requirement 
could lead the Idaho Supreme Court to be less deferential to the Legislature. For an illustra-
tion of an efficiency state’s high court focusing on output, yet still “abandon[ing] its tradi-
tional deference to the [legislature,]” and “establish[ing] a clear direction for the state’s edu-
cation policy,” see Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 123, at 608–09 (discussing Rose v. Council 
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)); see also infra Part IV.C.ii. 
183. Pennsylvania is an efficiency state that has not heard a challenge to the educa-
tion clause because the state’s supreme court has held the issue nonjusticiable. See Danson 
v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 428–429 (Pa. 1979); see also Pennsylvania: Litigation, EDUC. 
JUSTICE, http://www.educationjustice.org/states/pennsylvania.html (last visited June 29, 
2014). 
2014] WHEN WORDS FAIL: HOW IDAHO’S CONSTITUTION 
STYMIES EDUCATION SPENDING AND WHAT CAN BE 
DONE ABOUT IT 
125 
 
minimum level of funding required to carry out the education clause; 
second are those that define efficiency expansively; and third are those 
that treat efficiency with little distinction from the other word in its 
hendiadys pair.184 
In this section, this Note postulates that an efficiency requirement 
could yield positive results for funding in Idaho. But there are a variety 
of ways the Idaho Supreme Court could interpret the requirement, lead-
ing to varied results. It needs to be drafted properly to avoid an emascu-
lating interpretation. 
i. The Minimally Adequate Model 
Texas is an example of one interpretive model, under which effi-
ciency serves to establish a minimum funding level as a prerequisite to 
the education clause’s other mandates. In Edgewood Independent School 
District v. Kirby (Edgewood I), the Texas Supreme Court initially held 
that the efficiency provision in the Texas Constitution185 required a close 
correlation between the resources available to districts and their rela-
tive tax effort.186 After a series of failed legislative efforts to overcome 
Texas’s vast 700-to-1 property value disparity, a feature responsible for 
severe funding inequalities between districts,187 the Texas Supreme 
Court changed its approach and linked the efficiency and “general diffu-
sion of knowledge” requirements.188 This meant that so long as Texas 
districts had “substantially equal” access to funds up to a minimally ad-
equate level, disparities beyond that did not violate the efficiency stand-
ard.189 The minimally adequate level was, in turn, judged by students’ 
access to “an accredited education.”190 
The Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation is notable in finding this 
relationship between efficiency and the education clause’s requirement 
                                                     
184. See generally supra note 170 (discussing the hendiadys device). 
185. “[I]t shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suit-
able provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.” 
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of 
the 83rd Legislature) (emphasis added). 
186. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). See supra note 36 and cited 
sources for context on Edgewood I. 
187. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 36, at 615. By way of illustrating the severity 
of this figure, Idaho’s disparity in property values between the richest and poorest districts 
(Avery and Snake River, respectively), while still troubling, is only 68-to-1. See FERGUSON, 
supra note 6, at 12 tbl. 2.  
188. More precisely, this link was essentially a syllogism linking efficiency with 
equality, and equality with a “general diffusion of knowledge.” See Farr & Trachtenberg, 
supra note 36, at 692; Jensen supra note 12, at 31. 
189. The Texas Supreme Court defined “minimally adequate” in terms of the level 
required to meet the “general diffusion of knowledge” requirement also in the state’s consti-
tution. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 36, at 692–93. This required all districts to have 
“access to funds necessary to provide an accredited education.” Id. at 693.  
190. Id. at 692. 
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for a “general diffusion of knowledge.”191 In response to the litigation, 
Texas implemented a bill under which the property disparity dropped to 
28-to-1,192 illustrating the effectiveness of an efficiency requirement 
when property value disparity is the essential source of the adequacy 
problem.193 
The reasoning in Edgewood I that found an “implicit link”194 be-
tween efficiency and general diffusion is similar to the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in ISEEO V regarding thoroughness, with one key 
distinction. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that “‘a system based on 
loans alone [was] not adequate to meet the constitutional mandate [of 
thoroughness],’”195 but the Court never suggested that there was some 
minimal level of funding the Legislature failed to provide.196 Instead, 
the Court was concerned that the Legislature had not provided poor dis-
tricts with an adequate means of raising funds other than loans to fi-
nance capital improvements.197 In theory, this might mean there is no 
minimally adequate funding level in Idaho—only a minimally adequate 
method. For those who want a minimum dollar commitment of State 
funding, this is troubling. 
However, the distinction may be without a difference. The holding 
in ISEEO V with respect to thoroughness led to a logically similar re-
sult: thoroughness required access to safe facilities, so a system that 
permitted unsafe facilities in some districts was unconstitutional.198 By 
implication, the minimally adequate level of funding in Idaho is that 
which provides districts with safe facilities. Understood this way, the 
thoroughness provision in Idaho establishes a minimally adequate fund-
ing level the same way efficiency does in Texas.199 The primary differ-
                                                     
191. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Third 
Called Session of the 83rd Legislature); Jensen, supra note 12, at 31 (discussing the Texas 
Supreme Court’s recognition of an “implicit link . . . between efficiency and equality”).  
192. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 36, at 703. Texas plaintiffs later resumed liti-
gation, see Texas: Litigation, EDUC. JUSTICE, http://www.educationjustice.org/states/texas 
(last visited June 29, 2014), but the state is still an example of “the dramatic improvements 
attainable through litigation,” Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 36, at 727. 
193. This is important because many states, including Idaho, face the property dis-
parity problem. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 36, at 615 (“Although most states . . . 
have used some formula of adjustment to try to account for poor-property districts, the end 
result is the disparity displayed so vividly by Edgewood and Alamo Heights.”) (summarizing 
the infamous example of two Texas school districts with extreme resource disparities); 
FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 12 (displaying a table of taxable property value organized by 
Idaho school district). 
194. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989); supra note 188. 
195. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1203, 142 Idaho 450, 454 (2005) (quoting Idaho Sch. 
for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, No. 94008, at 8 (4th Jud. Dist. of Idaho Feb. 5, 2001), 
available at http://fourthjudicialcourt.idaho.gov/pdf/id_schools_decision.pdf).  
196. See id. at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460. 
197. Id. 
198. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
199. The Idaho Supreme Court has already alluded to this implicit link. For exam-
ple, in ISEEO I, the Court stated that if the plaintiffs showed “that they [could not] meet the 
[education] standards established by the State Board of Education . . . with the money pro-
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ence is the standard by which a court judges minimal adequacy.200 Tex-
as’s access-to-accredited-education standard was high because of how 
the Texas Supreme Court associated efficiency with “general diffusion of 
knowledge.”201 
The possible benefits from an efficiency requirement interpreted 
under the minimally adequate model are two-fold. First, it may help a 
court establish the existence of a minimum funding level if none exists. 
Second, it may heighten the standard by which that level is judged. The 
impact on education funding under this model ranges from no impact 
(i.e. minimal adequacy is too low to matter) to significant impact (i.e. 
minimal adequacy is high). All of that depends, as it did in Texas, on the 
other language in a state’s education clause and how a reviewing court 
establishes the relationship between efficiency and that language. 
ii. The Kentucky Model 
Under the second interpretive model, courts define efficiency ex-
pansively. Kentucky, the first and strongest example, saw perhaps the 
most effective reform from its education clause’s requirement for an “ef-
ficient system of common schools throughout the state.”202 In Rose v. 
Council for Better Education, Inc., the Kentucky Supreme Court estab-
lished nine standards defining the characteristics of an efficient educa-
tion system.203 Among the standards was a requirement that the system 
be sufficiently funded and have a goal of developing “seven [student] 
capacities.”204 The legislative response to Rose was widespread reform, 
                                                                                                                           
vided under the current funding system they will have presented an apparent prima facie 
case that the State has not established and maintained a system of thorough education.” 
ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 735, 123 Idaho 573, 584 (1993). 
200. In Texas, the standard was access to an accredited education. See supra note 
190 and accompanying text. In Idaho, the analogous standard would be access to safe facili-
ties conducive to learning. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Again, Idaho’s limita-
tion is this narrow construction of thoroughness; if access to safe facilities is the sole stand-
ard for minimal adequacy, one can see just how minimal the funding would be. 
201. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
202. KY. CONST. § 183 (West, Westlaw current with emergency effective legislation 
through the 2014 Regular Session).  
203. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989). 
204. The seven capacities are: “(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to 
enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient 
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed 
choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to 
understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-
knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient ground-
ing in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical herit-
age; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or voca-
tional fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) 
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete 
favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.” 
Id. 
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which included changes to the state’s funding scheme.205 The law im-
plementing Rose guaranteed a minimum commitment of spending by 
the state, and mandated that districts contribute a minimum of 0.3 
cents per dollar of assessed value in the district.206 The result of these 
dual minima was a $490 million injection into the Kentucky education 
system over a single academic year.207 Kentucky’s progress in reform 
drew national attention and boosted Kentucky students’ graduation 
rates and test scores.208 Eight other states have adopted the Rose seven-
capacity standard.209 
There are many reasons offered for the successful outcome in Rose, 
some of which might caution that Rose is not replicable.210 Even so, an 
efficiency requirement in the Idaho education clause could catalyze 
dramatic reform—including funding improvements—if the Idaho Su-
preme Court interpreted the requirement this expansively. To start, re-
quiring students to achieve “seven capacities” could inspire changes to 
Idaho’s curricula and the funds needed to offer them. Also, a funding 
mechanism like Kentucky’s, which included access to equalized funds,211 
could decrease the district funding disparities that spawned Idaho’s ed-
ucation finance litigation.212 
Although a Rose-style interpretation of efficiency would produce 
optimal results, it is also the least likely outcome in Idaho. First, as part 
of this expansive interpretation, the Idaho Supreme Court would be 
casting its definition of “efficiency” in terms of education standards, and 
then imposing those standards on the Legislature. This would, in effect, 
establish curricula guidelines—a level of policy influence the Idaho Su-
preme Court has already eschewed.213 Second, even if the Idaho Su-
                                                     
205. For a discussion of the key features of Kentucky’s post-Rose reform, see Trimble 
& Forsaith, supra note 123, at 612–13.  
206. Id. at 612. 
207. Id. at 613. 
208. Debra H. Dawahare, Public School Reform: Kentucky’s Solution, 27 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 27, 48 (2004).  
209. Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Texas. Kentucky: Court Interpretation of Education Article, EDUC. 
JUSTICE, http://www.educationjustice.org/states/kentucky.html (last visited June 29, 2014). 
210. Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 123, at 609–10 (highlighting as possible expla-
nations that Rose gave the Kentucky General Assembly the “political cover and an intellec-
tual framework for improving the schools”; that it created a sense of solidarity that mobilized 
the citizenry to support the change; that it was the result of key Kentucky leaders and organ-
izations; that it did not involve a request for redistribution from wealthy to poor districts; 
and that Kentucky is unique).  
211. See, e.g., id. at 612 (discussing Kentucky’s funding solution, which provided dis-
tricts with equalized and unequalized choices for funding beyond the guaranteed minimum). 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 20–24. 
213. See Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 640, 96 Idaho 793, 798 (1975) (reject-
ing arguments that the Idaho Constitution required equal per-pupil spending, because doing 
otherwise would be an “unwise and unwarranted entry into the controversial area of public 
school financing”); ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 734, 123 Idaho 573, 583 (1993) (“This Court is not 
well equipped to legislate ‘in a turbulent field of social, economic and political policy.’”); 
ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1208, 142 Idaho 450, 459 (2005) (“It is not our intent to substitute 
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preme Court did adopt such guidelines, the Legislature would also have 
to catch the same vision of broad reform when shaping its response to 
the holding.214 There is no way to predict whether this perfect storm 
would coalesce in Idaho the way it did in Kentucky; if it did, the result 
would be a tremendous win for education funding. 
iii. The Hendiadys Model 
Courts in efficiency states do not always interpret efficiency in 
meaningful separation from other education clause language.215 This 
can happen when efficiency is included as one of the words in a hendia-
dys-type phrase.216 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
consistently treated “the maintenance and support of a thorough and 
efficient system of free public schools”217 as an adequacy requirement 
dealing with fiscal resources and their educational outcomes.218 Similar-
ly, Ohio case law indicates its education clause’s requirement for a 
“thorough and efficient system of common schools”219 roughly expresses 
the concept of a minimally sufficient level of educational resources.220 
New Jersey and Ohio’s generalized interpretive approach may be an 
outworking of how the specific arguments in those states were litigat-
ed,221 but it also illustrates the possibility that a court might not view 
efficiency in conceptual isolation from other words in the education 
                                                                                                                           
our judgment on how to establish criteria for safe buildings or create a proper funding sys-
tem for that of the Legislature.”). 
214. The Kentucky General Assembly’s embracing of Rose was somewhat surprising 
to some. Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 123, at 609–10. Reasons for such a positive legisla-
tive response to Rose include the political cover and framework for reform it provided, the 
general call to action and sense of citizen-solidarity it created, and the fact that plaintiffs 
were not seeking to redistribute wealth from rich districts to poor districts. Id. 
215. Tractenberg, supra note 181, at 429. 
216. See generally supra note 170. 
217. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 5, 2013 election) 
(emphasis added). 
218. Tractenberg, supra note 181, at 431. 
219. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (West, Westlaw through files 1 to 94 and statewide is-
sue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)) (emphasis added). 
220. See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 741 (Ohio 1997) (“A school system could 
not be thorough and efficient if a ‘school district was receiving so little local and state reve-
nue that the students were effectively being deprived of educational opportunity.’”) (quoting 
Cincinnati Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ohio 1979)). Ohio could 
also serve as an example of the minimally adequate interpretive model, with “access to edu-
cational opportunity” defining the standard of minimal adequacy. See generally supra Part 
IV.C.i. 
221. Similar to Idaho, both New Jersey’s and Ohio’s education finance litigation be-
gan as equity challenges. See Tractenberg, supra note 181, at 420; Janis J. Winterhof, Note, 
From Rationing Toilet Paper to Computer Hook-Ups With Moscow: Wealth-Based Dispari-
ties in Public School Financing Are Held Unconstitutional in DeRolph v. Ohio, 31 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1998).  
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clause. This makes it difficult to isolate the effect of an efficiency re-
quirement. 
Still, one case deserves mention because it parallels ISEEO V. In 
DeRolph v. State, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down Ohio’s financing 
scheme because the “evidence [was] overwhelming that many districts 
[were] ‘starved for funds’ and lack[ed] teachers, buildings, or equip-
ment”222 as a result of disparities in property value.223 The Court identi-
fied such factors as insufficient funding for building maintenance, reli-
ance on property taxes for revenue, and requirements for district bor-
rowing224—the very problems identified in ISEEO V.225 
The DeRolph Court, however, was less diplomatic than the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and its holding was much broader. Ohio’s Supreme 
Court called for “a complete systematic overhaul,” and apostrophized 
lawmakers that “the time ha[d] come to fix the system.”226 This is a 
stunning contrast to the Idaho Supreme Court’s deferential and narrow 
ISEEO V holding.227 
A key difference underlying Ohio and Idaho’s education clauses is 
Ohio’s efficiency requirement.228 But the Ohio Supreme Court did not 
cite efficiency as the precise reason for its holding.229 Part of the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s reasoning rested on a concern that an education sys-
tem not be “mediocre but be as perfect as could humanly be devised.”230 
The Idaho Supreme Court never offered such lofty language as justifica-
tion for ISEEO V.231 Thus, while DeRolph may provide an example of 
what an efficiency requirement can accomplish, it may also only be a 
reflection of the different attitude towards education in Ohio. 
Positive outcomes aside, the New Jersey and Ohio education claus-
es are best viewed as examples of how not to draft an efficiency re-
quirement. This is because of the danger that efficiency not be given a 
useful, independent meaning when combined with another qualitative 
                                                     
222. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 745. 
223. Id. at 746. 
224. Id. at 747. 
225. See supra Part II.A. 
226. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 745.  
227. See supra Part II.A. 
228. Compare IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective 
legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature), with OHIO 
CONST. art. VI, § 2 (West, Westlaw through files 1 to 94 and statewide issue 1 of the 130th 
GA (2013-2014)). 
229. At one point, the Ohio Supreme Court seemed poised to discuss efficiency sepa-
rately from thoroughness, but went on to hold that the Ohio funding system “violate[d] the 
Thorough and Efficient Clause” as a whole. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 775–776 (Ohio 1997). 
230. Id. at 740 (quoting the Ohio Constitution’s framers). 
231. Although the Court recognized that ensuring the Legislature met its mandate 
under the thoroughness requirement was a “matter of great public importance,” ISEEO V, 
129 P.3d 1199, 1207, 142 Idaho 450, 458 (2005), the Court does not seem to value education 
as highly as the Ohio Supreme Court in DeRolph. Instead, in addition to holding education 
not to be a fundamental right, ISEEO III, 976 P.2d 913, 921, 132 Idaho 559, 567 (1998), the 
Court has stated that education is not even “implicit in [the] State’s concept of ordered liber-
ty.” ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 733, 123 Idaho 573, 582 (1993).  
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requirement. For Idaho’s education funding to improve, it cannot risk an 
emasculating judicial interpretation of “efficiency.” 
iv. Efficiency Requirement Summary 
Some efficiency states have experienced positive education finance 
reform. While it is impossible to credit the entirety of these reforms to 
that requirement, direct comparison helps isolate the usefulness of an 
efficiency requirement, and informs the difference it could make in Ida-
ho. The possibilities range from, at worst, no difference if the require-
ment is drafted in a hendiadys-type phrase, to at best, a comprehensive 
overhaul of Idaho’s education system. 
Somewhere in the middle is the possibility for another ISEEO V 
type of holding, but couched in broader terms that lead to a more drastic 
legislative response. One commonality in all the examples this section 
discussed is the opportunity for broad reform that the efficiency re-
quirement afforded in different contexts. This suggests that if such a 
requirement had existed in Idaho at the time of ISEEO V, even Idaho’s 
narrow issue of facilities funding could have also led to broad reform. 
The facilities issue would have likely implicated both efficiency and 
thoroughness. Instead of holding the system unconstitutional because it 
failed to provide a thorough education “as it relate[d] to school facili-
ties,”232 the Idaho Supreme Court could have used the same narrow 
problem to hold the entire system inefficient. The difference is that a 
holding of inefficiency calls for broader reform,233 because it implicates 
both resource inputs and educational outputs.234 By contrast, as the ac-
tual legislative response to ISEEO V illustrates, a thoroughness prob-
lem alone seems to only call for small-scale legislation like the SFIA.235 
An efficiency requirement appears to be a good step in improving 
Idaho’s education clause. Nevertheless, because there are risks of inter-
preting this requirement in ways that limit reform, it should be com-
bined with other improvements and drafted in a way to ensure it read as 
robustly as possible. 
                                                     
232. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460.  
233. Compare, e.g., DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 744 (admonishing the Ohio General As-
sembly “that it must create an entirely new school financing system” in order to meet the 
requirements of a “thorough and efficient” education system), and Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 
391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (“More money allocated under the present system . . . would at best only 
postpone the reform that is necessary to make the system efficient.”), with ISEEO V, 129 
P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460 (suggesting “a number of alternatives to assist school districts 
in providing a safe environment conducive to learning” in order to meet the thoroughness 
requirement). 
234. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra Part II.B. 
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D. Explicit Constitutional Funding Provisions 
Although all fifty state constitutions mandate the establishment of 
an education system, it is rare for the constitutions to flesh the mandate 
out in great detail.236 But there are exceptions, and these are offered in 
this section as examples of how Idaho could explicitly require its Legis-
lature to meet a specific funding level. 
Some constitutions require a basic level of funding tied to a figure 
such as total revenue or total student enrollment. For example, Mis-
souri’s constitution requires the state to provide a minimum level of ed-
ucation funding equivalent to 25% of state revenues.237 Oklahoma’s re-
quires a minimum state commitment of $42 per pupil based on the prior 
year’s enrollment,238 and California’s requires the greater of either $120 
per pupil or $2400 per district.239 California administers this require-
ment through equalized “revenue limits.”240 
Colorado’s amended education clause establishes a growth rate in 
education funding,241 instead of just an overall funding level. This was a 
response to an earlier amendment that limited the expansion of overall 
tax revenue to a specified formula, adversely affecting education fund-
ing.242 Amendment 23 was designed to reverse this trend by requiring 
the state to increase per-pupil funding by a rate of 1% over inflation for 
ten years, and by a rate equal to inflation thereafter.243 The provision 
was not a long-term solution, but did increase spending initially.244 
Admittedly, these constitutional provisions do not guarantee im-
proved education funding, because they are still susceptible to unfavor-
able judicial interpretations and budget crises. For example, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court has held that a constitutionally adequate level of 
funding requires no more than the 25% minimum.245 Oklahoma’s high 
                                                     
236. See supra notes 33, 38, and accompanying text.  
237. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 3(b) (West, Westlaw through the Nov. 6, 2012 General 
Election). 
238. OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(a) (West, Westlaw through amendments received 
through 11/1/2013). 
239. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through 
Ch. 16 of the 2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot). 
240. HEATHER ROSE & MARGARET WESTON, CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUE 
AND STUDENT POVERTY: MOVING TOWARD A WEIGHTED PUPIL FUNDING FORMULA 14 (2013), 
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_213HRR.pdf. 
241. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 17 (West, Westlaw current with amendments adopted 
through the Nov. 5, 2013 General Election). Colorado voters approved “Amendment 23” in 
2000. Iris J. Lav & Erica Williams, A Formula for Decline: Lessons from Colorado for States 
Considering TABOR, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 7 (Updated Mar. 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-19-05sfp.pdf. 
242. Lav & Williams, supra note 241, at 4, 7. 
243. Id. at 7. 
244. Id.  
245. Comm. for Educ. Equality v. Missouri, 294 S.W.3d 477, 488 (Mo. 2009) (“Plain-
tiffs are attempting to read a separate funding requirement into section 1(a) that would re-
quire the legislature to provide ‘adequate’ education funding in excess of the 25-percent re-
quirement contained in section 3(b). Such language does not exist.”). 
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court has refused to hear the merits on justiciability grounds,246 and in 
2003, California legislators imposed a change to the source of funds used 
to provide the constitutional minimum, which resulted in an overall re-
duction of funds.247 Finally, the Colorado electorate’s well-intentioned 
Amendment 23 was offset by the Colorado Legislature’s subsequent re-
definition of the base figure used to calculate the increase.248 
Despite these limitations, tying some component of education fund-
ing to inflation, revenue, or enrollment is appealing because it provides 
a clear and objective guideline outside the imagination of legislators and 
judges. In Idaho, where the Court has avoided suggesting a particular 
funding system,249 this approach might be a start to establishing a base 
level of state funding. Similar to Missouri’s 25% requirement,250 Idaho 
could make a formal, constitutional requirement out of the previously 
honored “informal rule that Idaho’s public schools should receive one-
half of the revenue appropriated from the General Fund.”251 Idaho could 
also follow Oklahoma or California and require a certain dollar figure 
per pupil be appropriated for education. If equalized, like in California, 
the provision could lessen funding disparities between Idaho districts. 
Finally, a provision like Colorado’s demanding a certain growth rate in 
funding could actually increase funding for Idaho education. 
Including an explicit funding requirement would likely not be a 
complete solution to providing a long-term and stable source of revenue 
for Idaho’s education; however, when combined with the other sugges-
tions for amended language, an explicit requirement could make an im-
portant difference by establishing a clear adequacy guideline. 
V. APPLYING THE EXAMPLES 
The climate for education finance reform in Idaho is stagnant. The 
issue has been litigated, and the education clause has already been em-
ployed to its most useful end: to produce a plaintiffs’ victory in ISEEO V. 
                                                     
246. Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Leg., 158 P.3d 1058, 1066 (Okla. 2007) 
(“Questions of fiscal and educational policy are vested in the Legislature, and its wisdom in 
these areas is not within the scope of this Court’s review.”). 
247. ROSE & WESTON, supra note 240, at 14 n.22. 
248. Amendment 23 FAQs, GREAT EDUC. COLO., 
http://www.greateducation.org/statistics-faqs/funding-faqs/amendment-23/ (last visited June 
29, 2014).  
249. See ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 1208–09, 142 Idaho 450, 459–60 (2005) (“By list-
ing these alternatives [to Idaho’s funding system], we are in no way usurping the Legisla-
ture’s role; we leave the policy decisions to that separate branch . . . .”).  
250.  MO. CONST. art. IX, § 3(b) (West, Westlaw through the Nov. 6, 2012 General 
Election). 
251. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 2; see also supra text accompanying note 57. 
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But after ISEEO V, Idaho still ranks among the lowest in such ratios as 
funding-per-pupil and public school spending-to-income.252 
This Note has suggested that the primary reason for this lack of 
improved funding lies in the language of the education clause and how 
the Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted that language. Simply stated, 
there is a mismatch between what public schools need and what the sys-
tem actually provides.253 This could persist in the face of ever-growing 
demands on Idaho’s education system unless the constitutional lan-
guage is aligned with modern needs. 
Plaintiffs in other states have experienced better progress under 
their education clauses. Language prioritizing education, efficiency re-
quirements, and explicit funding provisions are examples of constitu-
tional language that have helped these efforts by setting a higher bar. 
Using these examples, Idaho could fashion a constitutional amendment 
that would heighten the Legislature’s duty and increase education fund-
ing. This Note discusses the possibilities in two stages, beginning with 
the simplest to implement. 
A. Stage One: Simple Verbal Additions 
The first stage involves simple but significant verbal additions to 
the following three components of the Idaho Constitution: Article I, and 
the qualitative and duty phrases of the education clause. The combina-
tion of changes would make education both a fundamental right and the 
top legislative priority, and would require that the system be efficient. 
The first verbal addition would use positive language to make edu-
cation a fundamental right. This addition is a direct response to ISEEO 
I, where the Idaho Supreme Court held “that the ‘fundamental rights’ 
found in [the] state constitution are those expressed as a positive right,” 
which precluded the right to education from being ascribed fundamental 
status.254 
Although this language could appear in Article IX with the rest of 
the education clause, the Court’s discussion in ISEEO I implies the right 
would be better expressed on exactly the same plane as the other fun-
                                                     
252. Compare GOVERNMENTS DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION 
FINANCES: 2006, at 11 tbl. 11, 12 tbl. 12  (2008), available at 
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/school/06f33pub.pdf (ranking Idaho fiftieth in per-pupil spending 
and fortieth in spending-to-income based on data from 2005-2006 when ISEEO V was decid-
ed), with MARK DIXON, GOVERNMENTS DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION 
FINANCES: 2011, at 11 tbl. 11, 12 tbl. 12 (2013), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/school/11f33pub.pdf (ranking Idaho fiftieth in per-pupil spend-
ing and forty-third in spending-to-income based on data for fiscal year 2011).  
253. See generally TASK FORCE FOR IMPROVING EDUCATION 29–30 (Idaho State 
Board of Education 2013), available at 
https://www.boardofed.idaho.gov/board_initiatives/education_improvement_taskforce/Task%
20Force%20for%20Improving%20Education_Final_09-06-13.pdf (highlighting the dire finan-
cial needs of Idaho’s public schools). 
254. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 732, 123 Idaho 573, 581 (1993). 
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damental rights in Article I.255 Thus, to make clear education’s status as 
a fundamental right, an effective amendment would list “obtaining edu-
cation”256 alongside “enjoying and defending liberty; acquiring, pos-
sessing and protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safe-
ty.”257 This is the positive language the Court is looking for to establish 
a fundamental right, and a place among the other fundamental rights in 
Article I would drive that point deeper. 
The amendment should take this notion a step further by modify-
ing “education.” Two possible modifiers discussed in this Note—
“adequate” and “ample”—derive from the New Hampshire and Wash-
ington examples.258 By definition, “ample” is “more than adequate,”259 
and thus is the stronger of the two modifiers. The positive right, there-
fore, would optimally be phrased as “obtaining an ample education.” 
This verbal addition would encourage the Idaho Supreme Court to 
do two new things. First, it would encourage the Court to apply strict 
scrutiny when the right is allegedly infringed.260 This would be a boon to 
future plaintiffs, because it would require much less deference to the 
Legislature. Secondly, it would also require the Court to define “ample.” 
This could lead the Court to adopt standards—the Rose standards, for 
example261—characterizing ample. Where the Court has traditionally 
been so reticent to influence education policy, this verbal addition might 
demand it. 
The second verbal addition would borrow Washington’s “paramount 
duty” language to establish education’s heightened importance over oth-
er legislative endeavors.262 Idaho needs this constitutional priority in 
order to stop the crowding out of education spending by health and wel-
fare spending.263 
                                                     
255. There, the Court quoted Thompson, asserting that education was on a “different 
plane” than the fundamental rights set forth in Article I. Id. at 733, 123 Idaho at 582. 
256. Alternatively, one scholar recommends inserting the words “education consti-
tutes a fundamental right of all citizens” to effect the same result. Gormley, supra note 126, 
at 224. This Note declines to follow this generic approach because it would muddy Article I’s 
existing syntax and brevity. See infra text accompanying note 257. 
257. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legislation 
of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). 
258. It should be noted that neither states’ education clause explicitly modifies the 
word “education” with “adequate” or “ample.” See N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (West, Westlaw 
updated with laws current through Chapter 7 of the 2014 Reg. Sess., not including changes and correc-
tions made by the State of New Hampshire, Office of Legislative Services); WASH CONST. art. 9, § 1 
(West, Westlaw current through amendments approved 11-5-2013). Instead, “adequate” was 
read into New Hampshire’s fundamental right to education, and “ample” actually describes 
the Washington’s required level of provision. See Part IV.B.i–ii. 
259. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 39–40 (10th ed. 1993). 
260. Gormley, supra note 126, at 224. 
261. See supra note 204. 
262.  See WASH CONST. art. 9, § 1. 
263. See supra note 57. 
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As the Washington Supreme Court realized, even a plain meaning 
of “paramount” would require a legislature to make “a first priority” out 
of ensuring “fully sufficient funds” for schools.264 Thus, this seems to be 
the likeliest interpretation of paramount duty, and the amendment’s 
drafters could simply include the provision as part of the Idaho educa-
tion clause’s duty phrase: “it shall be the [paramount] duty of the 
[L]egislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a . . . system of . . . 
schools."265 
The third verbal addition adds an efficiency requirement to the ed-
ucation clause. While this could spur fundamental change to Idaho’s 
education finance system prior to litigation,266 the benefits of an effi-
ciency requirement would more realistically manifest through litigation 
itself. 
The catalyst would be the Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the requirement. This Note has posited three models other state high 
courts have used, with varying degrees of impact on education fund-
ing.267 Given the Court’s history of interpreting the education clause 
conservatively, and with deference to the Legislature, one should not 
expect an expansive Rose interpretation.268 The Court is simply too reti-
cent to impose a set of guidelines that would affect curricula.269 
Instead, it is more likely the Court would take the approach of the 
Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood.270 This would still be a win for Ida-
ho education, because it would call for a broad holding that the educa-
tion funding system as a whole is inefficient, which, in turn, would call 
for broader change than what Idaho’s SFIA produced. Moreover, an 
Edgewood-style efficiency interpretation directly addresses the district 
funding disparities afflicting Idaho’s current funding system, because it 
associates “inefficiency” with inequity. Because funding disparities have 
been at the heart of Idaho’s education finance litigation since Thompson, 
legislation aimed at reducing these disparities would also strike at the 
root problem. 
                                                     
264. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91, 95 (Wash. 1978) 
(analyzing the plain meaning of the word “paramount” and then clarifying what that re-
quired of the Washington Legislature). 
265. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legisla-
tion of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). A 1998 amendment 
to Florida’s constitution made providing education “a paramount duty” of the Florida Legis-
lature. Gormley, supra note 126, at 223 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1) (emphasis added). 
This Note suggests that in order to promote the optimal interpretation, Idaho’s amendment 
should use a definite article (“the” instead of “a”) to define “paramount duty.” That is, the 
goal is to establish one paramount duty: education. Using an indefinite article to describe 
this duty could lead to an interpretation that conflates it with other legislative duties. 
266. This, of course, would depend on how the Legislature understands its duty un-
der an efficiency requirement, and what legislation, if any, it enacts to produce efficiency. 
267. See supra Part IV.C. 
268. See supra Part IV.C.ii. 
269. But see supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing how making educa-
tion a fundamental right could change this deferential approach through strict scrutiny). 
270. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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The reason such legislation has never been enacted is that the Ida-
ho Supreme Court’s decisions have not called for it.271 The education 
clause’s uniformity requirement, the likeliest constitutional grounds for 
attacking funding disparities, proved impotent for that purpose in 
Thompson and in ISEEO I.272 An efficiency requirement, on the other 
hand, could spur that legislative response, because it could provide the 
textual link needed for the Court to finally recognize that all students 
deserve access not only to a safe environment, but to a more generous 
level of resources overall.273 
There are two drafting considerations with an efficiency require-
ment. The first was discussed at supra Part III.A.iii, and advises against 
placing the requirement in a hendiadys phrase, which could lead to an 
emasculating judicial interpretation. Thus, Idaho should avoid simply 
placing “efficient” alongside some other provision of the qualitative 
phrase with a conjunctive link. 
A related drafting consideration is whether “efficient” should modi-
fy the public school system,274 or the Legislature’s duty. Put another 
way, the question is whether efficient should relate to the clause’s quali-
tative phrase or duty phrase. The better drafting move is the first, be-
cause it focuses on the education system as a whole. A system is “char-
acterized by a functional relationship, organization, coordination, inter-
connection, and interdependence.”275 Rendering all these moving parts 
efficient makes system-wide change more realistic than simply requir-
ing the legislature to legislate efficiently. 
Taking the two verbal additions pertaining to the education clause 
together and using an Oxford comma276 in the qualitative phrase would 
result in the following: “it shall be the [paramount] duty of the legisla-
ture of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform[,] thorough, 
[and efficient] system of public, free common schools.”277 
                                                     
271.  See, e.g., ISEEO V, 129 P.3d 1199, 142 Idaho 450 (2005); see generally supra 
Part II. 
272. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra Part IV.C.i. 
274. E.g., TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 
Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature) (requiring an “efficient system of public free 
schools”) (emphasis added). 
275. Tractenberg, supra note 181, at 426 (describing the dominant traits of a “sys-
tem” in the education context). 
276. Why the Oxford (serial) comma? Because it is never wrong, and omitting it can 
create ambiguity. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK 4 (2d ed. 2006). Here, it is critical that 
“efficient” not lose its independent meaning, as in the hendiadys examples discussed at supra 
Part IV.C.iii. The Oxford comma keeps the essential word separate. 
277. See IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective leg-
islation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature).  
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B. Stage Two: Explicit Funding Provision 
The second stage explores adding an explicit education funding re-
quirement like those discussed at supra Part IV.D to the Idaho Consti-
tution. It should be explored prior to implementation because it is in-
herently complex, and it involves difficult policy questions: Should the 
constitution actually specify a level of funding? If so, how would that 
level be calculated, or account for inflation? Should it be tied to an inde-
pendent figure like general revenue or enrollment? How would such a 
provision be integrated with Idaho’s balanced budget provisions?278 An-
swers to these questions should be supported by thorough economic 
analysis, which this Note has not attempted, and which Idaho leaders 
would do well to conduct. 
Until then, the Legislature should gather relevant information, but 
should take up this sort of amendment after the verbal additions at su-
pra Part V.A have been incorporated. Focusing political efforts on the 
simple changes first would lay a strong constitutional foundation for 
education, and would give time for the analytical work needed to suc-
cessfully implement the second stage. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When words fail, one option is to find new words—better words. 
Idaho plaintiffs seeking judicial declarations of and remedies for inade-
quate education funding face significant obstacles, which the existing 
education clause cannot remove. Even after the Idaho Supreme Court 
struck down the education finance system in ISEEO V, resources avail-
able to Idaho’s public schools remain inadequate. This is primarily be-
cause of the minimal standards of Idaho’s education clause, and the 
lines the Idaho Supreme Court has drawn when interpreting the 
clause’s key provisions. 
The words of Idaho’s constitution have failed. Idaho needs to 
amend its constitution with better words in order to improve education 
funding. Idaho voters who share a recognition of the need for improved 
education funding should avail themselves of the constitutional amend-
ment process, borrowing language from states that have seen successful 
education finance reform. 
Jeffrey J. Grieve  
 
                                                     
278. IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legisla-
tion of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature); IDAHO CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1 (West, Westlaw through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular 
Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). One can imagine how this would become problematic 
during times of economic distress, when spending cuts may be required. See Phil Oliff et al., 
States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (Up-
dated June 27, 2012), available at http:// www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf. 
